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


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

MONOGRAPH #12

HUMAN RELATIONS
IN THE
MILITARY ENVIRONMENT



AUGUST 1978

LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970s



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⑨ LEADERSHIP MONOGRAPH SERIES *no 12*

MONOGRAPH 12

⑥ Leadership for the 1970s.
HUMAN RELATIONS

IN THE

MILITARY ENVIRONMENT.

by

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MAJOR RAYMOND C. HARTJEN, JR.

⑪ Aug 1978

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LEADERSHIP MONOGRAPH SERIES


This monograph represents a continuation of the series initiated as an outgrowth of the Leadership for the Seventies Study and the CONARC Leadership Board. The Leadership Monograph Series is intended to keep Army leaders abreast of pertinent and recent findings and research in the fields of management and leadership.

Monograph 8, A Matrix of Organizational Leadership Dimensions, was explored and developed in previous monographs and focused primarily on the organizational aspects of leadership. Nine dimensions of organizational leadership were identified in terms of both leadership levels and identifiable behaviors.

→ This present monograph is an expansion of the Human Relations dimension of organizational leadership identified in Monograph 8. It explores human relations in terms of interpersonal interaction and organizational development. Because this monograph is intended for service school instructors, it departs from the usual format and presents the subject first in terms of practical application, followed by the theoretical and historical basis for human relations development.

The views expressed in this monograph are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the U. S. Army Administration Center.

Your comments, criticisms, and contributions beneficial to improving this publication or to identifying future research topics are welcome. Correspondence should be addressed to this Headquarters, ADMINCEN, ATTN: ATZI-CD-HRD.


B. L. HARRISON
Major General, USA
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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	iv
Foreward	v
PART I	
HUMAN RELATIONS IN PRACTICE	1
Chapter One INTRODUCTION	1
Goals	2
The Human Side of Leadership	15
Chapter Two PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS - CASE STUDIES	17
Case One: Specialist Jones	17
Case Two: Staff Sergeant Nader	18
Case Three: Major Phramus	21
Case Four: Major Blank	23
Case Five: Lieutenant Colonel Gross	25
Case Six: Lieutenant Silver	26
Case Seven: Race Relations	28
PART II	
HUMAN RELATIONS IN THEORY	35
Chapter Three LEVELS OF HUMAN RELATIONS	36
Delimitations	36
The Individual	36
The Individual in the Organization	41
Job Satisfaction	42
Supervision	48
Management and the Individual	49
The Group	51
Status	55
Morale	57
Identification	59
The Leader in the Organizational Group	61
Leader Training	67
Power	71
Communication	75
Ethics and the Leader	77
Summary	80

Chapter Four	HUMAN RELATIONS SKILLS	81
	First-line Supervisor	81
	Low Level Supervisor	88
	Middle Level Supervisor	90
	Top Level Supervisor	96
	Executive Level Supervisor	99
	Summary	101
PART III	HUMAN RELATIONS HISTORICALLY	105
Chapter Five	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	106
	Summary	112
PART IV	FINAL THOUGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS	118
Chapter Six	FINAL THOUGHTS	119
Chapter Seven	IMPLICATIONS	127
BIBLIOGRAPHY		129

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 3-1 Self-Concept in the Classic Theory of Behavior Model	37
Figure 3-2 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs	39
Figure 3-3 Personal Development	40
Figure 3-4 Impact of Counseling on the Individual in the Organization	47
Figure 3-5 Relationship Between Task & Resources	51
Figure 3-6 Formation of Member Values	52
Figure 3-7 Learning Process	66
Figure 3-8 Leader Effectiveness	69
Figure 3-9 Effects of Anxiety	70
Figure 3-10 Methods of Influence	73
Figure 3-11 The Ethical Spectrum	78
Figure 4-1 Information Requirements	85
Figure 4-2 Human Relations Decision Progression	86
Figure 4-3 Skills Appropriate to Supervisory Levels	101
Figure 5-1 Relationships	106
Figure 5-2 Relationships	108
Figure 5-3 Relationships	112
Figure 5-4 Evolution of Personnel Officer Role	113
Figure 5-5 Frame of Reference, Organizational Behaviour	115
Figure 6-1 Three Types of Leadership	124

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
Table 3-1 Unfulfilled Needs	44

FOREWORD

Much has been written about the many aspects and dimensions of leadership. This monograph is an attempt to view in depth the human relations dimension of leadership identified in Monograph 8 and expanded in Monograph 9. For the purposes of this monograph, supervisory levels in the military organization identified in Monograph 8 will be used instead of rank or grade identifications. This makes the concepts as applicable for the NCO supervisor as they are for the general officer.

Human relations will be addressed from three aspects: (1) the individual as he or she relates to self and others, (2) the role of the individual within the military organizational structure, and (3) the role of the leader in the organizational group.

Human relations is important in varying degrees to every aspect of military life. It affects every personal interaction. To make the most of this dimension of leadership, a leader needs to possess an understanding of himself, of others, of the environment in which the interaction takes place, and the ability to communicate that understanding to others. The leader who is insensitive to the needs of others or who is unskilled in human relations should not be surprised ultimately to find himself or herself ignored or rejected by subordinates, peers, and superiors. Organizational success may be dependent on the application of human relations skills. This monograph is not designed to provide the final answer to human relations problems. It is designed to be of value in fostering a greater awareness of human relations and its correlation to the attainment of organizational objectives. It is directed primarily toward the trainer; however, it is applicable to all leadership levels.

PART I

HUMAN RELATIONS

IN

PRACTICE

Monograph 12

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A leader in the armed forces today is many things: a supervisor in the organization, a participator in extra-organizational relationships with others, and probably an important part of a family group. Each role has its own attendant responsibilities. Human relations cannot be a dimension of leadership used only within the organization and then put away after duty hours. Human relations is a concept of interpersonal communications and interactions which is present in all aspects of life within a society. These interactions are the basis upon which the entire military structure is built. Human relations provides the cement which holds the organization together and enables it to accomplish its objectives. To insure the continuation of a military establishment capable of mission accomplishment, the Army leader today must possess an awareness of the importance of the role of human relations in the effectiveness of the organization.

Monograph 8, A Matrix of Organizational Leadership Dimensions, identified human relations as one of the nine dimensions which contribute to effective leadership. The other eight dimensions were communication, counseling, supervision, technical proficiency, management science, decision-making, planning, and ethics. Monograph 9 further examined the leadership dimensions in terms of specific tasks and skills required in each dimension as they differed across the five levels of supervision from first-line through executives. This monograph will examine only the dimension of human relations. It will identify central concerns and examine each to prepare supervisors and leaders at all levels to function more effectively in the military organization.

Monograph 8 described human relations as a competence which focuses on the individual. Tannenbaum, Waschler and Massarich (1961) contend that "human relations" has four principal connotations:

1. Human relations as inter- and intra-personal phenomena--describing relations between one person and another, and the relationship of an individual with himself.
2. Human relations as a tool kit for practitioners--various techniques and methods for identifying and treating problems which

result from inter- and intra-personal relationships. Human relations has both procedural and behavioral implications.

3. Human relations as an ethical orientation, where value judgments are based on the degree to which human relations skills and techniques are employed.

4. Human relations as a scientific discipline, where it becomes a legitimate field of study involving the entire spectrum of social science.

Goals

The goals of this monograph are:

1. To explain the impact of human relations at each of the five supervisory levels identified in Monograph 8 and to show the importance of human relations in the accomplishment of the organizational mission.

2. To explain the impact of the leader's awareness of himself, his role in the organization, his influence on others, and how his personal behavior and his understanding of the behavior of others impact on organizational goal attainment.

3. To provide a common base or level of understanding and awareness upon which to further develop human relations within the military organization.

These goals overlap and directly reinforce the traditional Army principles of leadership listed in FM 22-100; i.e., "know yourself and seek self-improvement, know your men and look out for their welfare, and train your men as a team." This monograph serves as a means to achieve the traditional concepts of mission accomplishment and troop welfare. While it is not a lesson plan for teaching human relations, it does provide the framework and data for planning programs to meet individual and organizational needs. It is hoped that a better understanding of the impact of human relations on organizational mission accomplishment will generate a more productive working atmosphere in the armed forces.

Skill in human relations integrates the needs of the individual with organizational objectives. Such skills allow one to deal with other people effectively. We must, however, expand on the concept of

dealing with others. In its parochial sense, "to deal with" implies a degree of manipulation or molding to suit one's own purposes. In a broader sense, it means to interact. It is in the broader sense that this monograph will examine human relations.

Human relations problems in the military organization can be divided into two general categories: those which are generated and maintained through individual interaction, and those which are generated and maintained by the organizational structure. The leader who is insensitive to the needs of his subordinates creates a human relations problem. Similarly, a problem is created when an organization establishes criteria for promotion to managerial positions which cannot be met by minority members. Whatever the source of the human relations problem, the impact on the organization is nearly always negative. In the following cases, how many situations can you recognize from your personal experience?

Case One: Specialist Jones

Specialist Jones came to the attention of his company commander after he was arrested for beating his wife. He had exhibited aggressive behavior before, but he was now genuinely sorry for having struck his spouse. The commander considered the problem as a simple domestic squabble. Shortly after this incident, Jones again came to the attention of his commander. This time he had been arrested by the local police for participating in a barroom brawl. Now the commander became more concerned with the cause of Jones' deviant behavior. Since Jones refused to discuss the matter with him, the commander referred Jones to the post mental health clinic for evaluation and treatment.

After several sessions some important facts were identified. Jones dropped out of high school in his junior year to support his family after his father suffered a long illness. He was reasonably successful and after his father recuperated sufficiently to support his family, Jones married his high-school sweetheart. By this time Jones had been out of school for three years and felt awkward about returning to finish the requirements for a diploma. He had a family of his own to support. Shortly after learning that his wife was pregnant, Jones started looking around for a means to advance himself on the job.

Jones found that he needed a diploma in order to be promoted. Jones discovered that similar jobs with different organizations also required a high school diploma for promotion. Later Jones met a

recruiter who showed him how he could finish his education while serving in the Army. Jones enlisted in the Army in a combat arm in order to draw the combat arms enlistment bonus.

When Jones got to his first unit, he asked his squad leader about educational programs. The squad leader thought that it was a great idea, but that unit mission requirements didn't allow for school at that time. The squad leader did, however, promise to send Jones to school "at the first opportunity."

Two years passed and Jones still waited for the first opportunity. A hard worker, Jones was rapidly promoted to E-4 and he was generally satisfied with his job. His needs had also increased. In addition to the first child, the Jones now had a set of twins. He was feeding his family with food stamps and was living in a converted garage. There was never enough money to meet needs; every family argument centered on finances.

When Jones acquired sufficient time in grade for promotion to E-5, he was sent before the local promotion board. It was there that his educational deficiency came back to haunt him. He found he needed a high school diploma in order to qualify for promotion. Jones was caught in a dilemma. His platoon sergeant told him that he was too valuable to lose during the period required for school. He was so valuable, in fact, that he had become a squad leader when that person had been reassigned. Jones could not go to school at night; he worked at a part-time job in order to meet money needs at home. Jones was under considerable stress, felt that he could in no way influence his situation, and became more and more withdrawn. Jones started "having a few drinks" on the way home. He lost his part-time job. Family fights increased. His job performance dropped, a new squad leader was assigned, and the platoon leader told him he could not go to school until he shaped up. It was at this point that Jones came to the attention of his commander.

Case Two: Staff Sergeant Nada

Sergeant Nada was drafted during the pre-Viet Nam era and quickly developed a fondness for the tanks upon which he was trained. He derived great satisfaction from being the best gunner in his platoon and quickly won recognition for his gunnery skill from his peers and seniors in the battalion. During his tours in combat he was wounded once and decorated for valor twice. Frequently he served as a tank commander until a more senior person could be assigned to his crew.

By the end of the war, Nada was a sergeant and considered himself to be a highly competent career soldier.

Following his last combat tour, Nada was assigned at his request to a tank battalion in Europe. His prowess as a gunner again rapidly distinguished him among his peers and, because there was a shortage of qualified tank commanders, he was promoted and assigned to command a tank crew.

It was at this point that Staff Sergeant Nada first experienced problems. Although he had frequently commanded a tank in combat, he had never been required to function as a leader in a peacetime situation. An easygoing sort, he quickly found out that his crew took advantage of his good nature. The platoon sergeant began taking him to task for the condition of the billets, the cleanliness of his area in the motor pool, and various things other than his ability to fight a tank. For the first time in his life, Nada found his professional competence being questioned. He did not much care for this negative feedback and took every step he knew to meet the expectations of his supervisors.

In spite of his attempts to improve, Nada continued to be unsuccessful. During the next tank gunnery program his crew failed to qualify. The platoon sergeant started calling him a dumb Mexican, the Frito Bandido and other less printable names. He was subjected constantly to a stream of abuses for even the most minor shortcomings. He found himself pulling every dirty detail in the company.

Several months later Sergeant Nada received a low enlisted efficiency report. His platoon leader counseled him by saying that his next efficiency report would even be worse if he did not shape up. Nada, by now half-convinced that he really was incapable, went to the NCO club and drowned his sorrows. That solution proved so effective that he became a frequent patron of the bar. Occasionally his hang-over was so great that he was late for work. Having failed to report at all one day, he found himself before the company commander for punishment. After a brutal confrontation by the commander, Nada found himself poorer by seven days pay. He also lost a considerable amount of self-esteem. At home that night, his wife told Nada that his troubles were known throughout the battalion. Several families whom they considered to be friends began to ignore them. Nada became socially and professionally a lonely man.

It was a great relief to Nada when he was transferred back to the United States. His relief was short-lived, however. When he reported for duty he found that his new first sergeant was his former platoon sergeant from Europe. Nada found himself a marked man. Nothing he did suited his leaders, and several times he was threatened with reduction in rank for inefficiency. The battalion command sergeant major counseled him once and then gave up on him. His wife began to criticize him for not being promoted like everyone else and threatened to leave him. Early one morning, while serving as sergeant of the guard, Sergeant Nada put his pistol in his mouth and blew off the back of his head.

Case Three: Major Phramus

Major Phramus was the executive officer of a battalion. Phramus was also in trouble. As chief materiel readiness officer of the battalion, it was his job to insure the unit remained combat ready. Unfortunately, the battalion's aged, much-used vehicles and equipment seldom cooperated by running at unit readiness reporting time. Long hours spent by Phramus and the battalion's maintenance personnel could not keep the unit in a combat-ready posture. A highly competent careerist, Phramus was deeply concerned with his unit's readiness. The division commander insisted on accurate reports. This gave Phramus heart, for he felt that if he could bring the problem to the attention of the division's leadership, he would get the help he needed to bring the unit up to prescribed standards. This feeling was short-lived, however, for the assistant division commander announced that all vehicles would be reported "in the best possible light." That was translated to mean that if the vehicle could be made to run in 48 hours, it was to be reported as if it were in fact already running.

This conflict in guidance caused Phramus great anxiety. His predecessor had been unsuccessful in bringing the unit up to acceptable readiness posture. That officer had been transferred, never to be heard from again. Phramus was not anxious to suffer a similar fate; neither was he prepared to resort to what he considered an outright lie in the preparation of the unit report. His battalion commander, concerned with retaining his command and promoting his career, was unwilling to support any course of action which would affect his concerns. After several sleepless nights, Phramus accurately reported his unit in a readiness condition four, (REDCON 4), the lowest possible rating. Within the hour the division operations officer had Phramus in his office to explain the report. Other senior

officers were also present. After a review of the equipment status, thinly-veiled threats left little doubt in Phramus' mind that his career was to be decided right there in that office. That he was caught in an ethical dilemma was quite clear. In the end, careerism won out and the unit miraculously changed to readiness condition three in the middle of the operations officer's office. Eventually Phramus was promoted and went on to command his own battalion. The division operations officer was also promoted on schedule. The assistant division commander got bigger and better commands of his own. It is not known if the vehicles were ever repaired; it is known that the unit was never again reported as being in readiness condition four.

Case Four: Major Blank

Major Blank had a different problem. He was commanding an air cavalry troop and a veteran of three combat tours in five years. He was also an alcoholic.

Blank achieved alcoholic status gradually. He had served in several cavalry units where hard drinking was expected. Problems with alcohol started during his second combat tour while he was serving as an attack helicopter platoon leader. He began having a few drinks after missions to "unwind." Soon he was having a couple of premission drinks to "loosen up." By the time his second tour was over, Blank had been decorated several times for valor and had achieved a reputation of absolute fearlessness. Blank was greatly relieved and not a little surprised when he completed that tour and was sent home.

For a while after his return Captain Blank seemed to be putting himself back together. He started sleeping better and spent fewer hours at the club. He was flying regularly, but was too junior in his new unit to have much leadership responsibility. He enjoyed the way the new warrant officer and lieutenant pilots looked up to him. At home his wife was glad that Blank had reduced his consumption of alcohol, although she still thought he drank too much. The children were getting old enough to participate in family activities, and the prognosis for the family group was promising.

It was at this point that Blank's unit was alerted for deployment to Viet Nam.

Blank had completed two combat tours and had been home less than a year. He could have been replaced. Certainly his wife pleaded with him often enough to request that he be replaced. Blank's commander,

however, was campaigning hard to take Blank with the unit. Personnel were shuffled and Blank found himself a gun platoon leader again. He really didn't want to go back into combat, but he felt that if he did not he would be branded a coward. Concern for what his peers thought finally outweighed personal and family wishes and he volunteered for combat. The commander said he was proud of him. Mrs. Blank cried herself to sleep. Blank went to the club with the rest of his platoon and got roaring drunk.

Once in combat, Blank resumed his heavy drinking. He became withdrawn and seldom spoke to anyone, including his own crew. Rumor had it that Blank and his wife were on the verge of divorce. That was a private matter, however, and the commander was reluctant to talk about it with Blank. The commander had talked to Blank about spending so much non-flying time at the bar in the officers' tent. He received a sub-standard efficiency report, primarily because of his drinking. Blank rarely left his own tent after that. He could be found there with a drink in his hand whenever he was not actually flying.

Three months into Blank's third tour his helicopter was hit by ground fire and crashed in a ball of fire. One crewman died in the crash. Blank pulled himself and the body of his co-pilot from the burning wreck and collapsed just as assistance arrived.

Blank was badly burned on the face and hands and was medically evacuated. While he was in the hospital he learned that he had been selected for temporary promotion to major. He had a friend smuggle in a fifth and he celebrated until it was gone.

Back again for duty, Blank found himself commanding an air cavalry troop in the States. The job requirements were not too great; he had an excellent executive officer who handled almost everything for him. The war was winding down and there were more pilots around than aircraft to be flown. Blank was getting pressure from his branch in Washington to complete his college degree, but he was not yet ready to go back to school. In fact, Blank was not quite ready for anything. He was way behind in meeting his minimum flying hours, he was still withdrawn and uncommunicative, and frequently he did not make it home at night. After the club closed he would go back to his office and sleep on the sofa.

Blank's combat reputation finally wore thin. The squadron commander gave him another sub-standard efficiency report and threatened to relieve him from command if his performance did not improve. Other

officers in the squadron no longer stood in line to hear his infrequent words. One evening he went home and found his family gone. Two months later he learned that he had not been selected for permanent promotion.

Case Five: Lieutenant Colonel Gross

Lieutenant Colonel Gross was a dedicated, vigorous, intelligent and capable officer. He had served with great distinction in both staff and command positions at many levels of the Army during his sixteen years of service. Unfortunately, during that period he had become considerably more well-rounded physically than the organization to which he was assigned considered fashionable. He readily admitted to being 50 or 60 pounds overweight. Colonel Gross also possessed one of the keenest minds in his headquarters. His capacity for lasagne was exceeded only by his capacity for work. Being a bachelor, Gross viewed the Army weight requirement with a jaundiced eye and rationalized his overweight condition on the following basis:

1. He was forced to eat out frequently. Everyone knows restaurant food is fattening.
2. He could still pass the annual PT test.
3. He weighed within 20 pounds of his present weight when he commanded a company in combat. His performance at that weight was good enough to earn him secondary-zone promotions to both major and lieutenant colonel.
4. When he reported for his present assignment, he was under the impression that the general wanted to work him, not breed him.

Colonel Gross ran two miles every morning and played racquetball on weekends. He neither drank nor smoked. He worked approximately 12 hours a day and believed his weight to be no one's business but his own.

Since Colonel Gross was not seemingly concerned with his weight and was very effective in his primary group, there would appear to have been no real problem. The commanding general of the post, however, personally reviewed the officer efficiency reports submitted on all overweight officers in the command. As luck would have it, Gross was one of the first officers to have a report reviewed. Both Gross's rater and indorser fully supported the Army's weight program.

Although they agreed that Gross was the most competent officer in his grade in the headquarters, they each lowered his rated score by six points because of his demonstrated unwillingness to lose weight. This score placed Gross in the bottom quarter of his peer group, several points lower than an alcoholic of the same rank who was prone to frequent relapses which affected his job performance. With selection rates to colonel hovering around the 30% mark, it was obvious to Gross that additional reports of this kind would force him to retire as a lieutenant colonel. Still, Lieutenant Colonel Gross maintained that his weight was his own business and refused to diet.

Case Six: Lieutenant Silver

Lieutenant Silver was a young officer serving his initial obligatory tour. Airborne and Ranger qualified, Silver strove to project a tough, competent image. He was absolutely uncompromising in his beliefs. Silver knew he made things rough for his platoon, but he believed that they respected tough officers and that his every action was in their own best interests. He was somewhat disturbed that whenever he approached a group from his platoon they dispersed immediately. He rationalized that they dispersed in order to get back to work. Silver was troubled by the fact that other company officers also avoided him. It was true that he was taller, straighter, and had a more commanding voice than the others; perhaps they did not care to be compared with him. For whatever reason, Silver frequently felt alone.

Silver's platoon struggled to meet his standards. Their hair got shorter, their fatigue uniforms acquired razor-sharp creases, their boots became mirror-bright, and the armored personnel carriers rapidly became showpieces. Whenever the battalion commander inspected Silver's platoon, he always gave it special mention. Silver was proud of that and urged his men to make greater efforts. He felt that if things kept going as they were, he might even get a company command while he was still a lieutenant. That would certainly help his career.

Some small problems began to surface, however. The platoon sergeant kept telling Silver that he was too tough on the troops, and that the noncommissioned officers were complaining about his meddling in their jobs. Silver was convinced that the grumbling was the result of his determination to make the NCO's meet Army standards. He was sure that if he quit checking oil levels and peering under mattresses, the NCO's would revert to coffee-drinking and lie-swapping. After

all, had he not found a dirty rag behind a radiator in the barracks after the platoon sergeant assured him the platoon was ready for inspection? As far as Silver was concerned, the platoon still had a long way to go to meet his standards.

One Friday afternoon an engine in one of Silver's personnel carriers broke down. It would have to be replaced, but the maintenance section could not get to it until sometime Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning. Silver kept the crew late Friday night scrubbing the engine compartment. When he checked just before dinner it was not clean enough, so he ordered the crew back to work Saturday morning. The crew worked until noon on Saturday and Silver was pleased that he had insisted the job be done right. The maintenance officer would really be surprised to see the engine compartment looking factory-fresh. He might even tell the battalion commander about it.

Monday morning came, but three men who had worked on Saturday did not show up until after the noon meal. Silver was livid. He marched the trio to the company commander and demanded that they be punished. The commander called in the first sergeant while Silver waited in the orderly room. The platoon sergeant and squad leader were called before the commander and then left. A few minutes later the soldiers emerged looking somewhat relieved. They cast furtive glances toward Silver as they left the orderly room. Silver was about to follow them when the commander summoned him into the office.

The commander told Silver that he had investigated the matter to his satisfaction and had found that the crew members had in fact been absent from duty without proper authority. He did think, however, that there were some extenuating circumstances, but to maintain discipline he had restricted and admonished the crew for their absence.

Silver was stunned. He had expected each man to be reduced one rank and fined about one hundred dollars. He considered the penalty to be a slap at him personally. To him, it was practically the same as condoning the behavior. He thought that he would have to tighten the reins or the whole platoon might take unauthorized vacations.

The commander was not through with Silver. He insisted that Silver sit down and talk. He reviewed the accomplishments and the improvements of the platoon since Silver joined the unit. Silver felt a glow of pride start to creep through his body. The warm glow cooled rapidly when the commander said that, in spite of outward appearances,

he believed the platoon to be less capable of performing its mission now than when Silver joined the organization.

Case Seven: Race Relations

A group of black airmen took over the base recreation center to protest discrimination both on and off the base. The demonstration was spontaneous and lasted 24 hours. The demonstrators had anticipated violence and arrest, which fortunately did not occur. The base commander interviewed four representatives selected by the demonstrators. The commander's inquiry produced the grievances listed below (Dansby, 1975):

- 1) The situation concerning discrimination against blacks on base and by the local community which had existed during an evaluation of attitudes and feelings of personnel conducted earlier in the year was still prevalent. No perceptible improvement had occurred, and there was no way a black airman could find off-base recreation--social or religious diversions--in the local community.
- 2) Because of the conditions stated above, the black airmen believed that the tour of duty at this installation should have been shortened.
- 3) Because of the conditions in 1) above, the black airmen were forced into driving a certain distance in order to obtain recreation and relaxation. Such mobility increased their exposure to accidents, traffic violations, and mechanical difficulties, which, in turn, caused other incidents, such as reporting late for duty. Some late reporting resulted in disciplinary action, in spite of commanders policy of leniency if the authorities at the base were properly notified in advance of reporting times.
- 4) The black airmen believed that they were being administered an inordinately large percentage of the nonjudicial punishments, as well as being unduly harassed by the Air Police.

- 5) The black airmen believed that passive discrimination was being practiced against them by the local managers of on-base hiring activities, such as the base-exchange, bowling alley, and dining hall contractors. Applications for employment had been submitted by black but had mysteriously disappeared from files, and only token employment for blacks had occurred in these agencies.
- 6) The black airmen believed that the Human Relations Council was ineffective and not representative.
- 7) A large percentage of the black airmen stated that when they brought problems to their supervisors, nothing was done about them.
- 8) The black airmen complained of lack of common courtesy in the dormitories on the part of maids, civil-engineering employees, and other inspection personnel, who entered their rooms without knocking.
- 9) There were complaints about continual supervisor harassment of blacks with authorized shaving excuses because of pseudofolliculitis (ingrown hairs), as well as difficulty in securing medical waivers for not shaving.
- 10) The airmen spoke of extensive use of and threats to use the Record of Individual Counseling, with the connotation that all such counseling is derogatory in nature.
- 11) There were daily occurrences of the words "nigger" and "boy" directed at the black airmen.
- 12) The airmen believed that praise was not given when earned but that supervisors were quick to criticize.
- 13) Black women were unable to obtain satisfactory hair-styling service in the base beauty shop.

Investigation of the grievances generally substantiated the allegations. Additionally, the investigators found that there was a lack of communications between all airmen and their superiors. The

supervisors minimized and dismissed the problems as unimportant. At upper managerial levels, little evidence was found of aggressive problem solving or follow-up action. Superiors were ignorant of problem-solving procedures or of councils established for this purpose. Lower-ranking personnel considered the open door policies as being only theoretical. They were afraid to see their commanders because they believed their problem would be ignored or they would be chastised for speech, dress, or military bearing deficiencies. Investigators also found a disproportionate number of blacks being assigned to remote duty stations.

Following an analysis of the facts, the base commander came to a number of conclusions. Dansby (1975) lists these as:

1. This installation is unique in that there is absolutely no black community nor a section of town for off-duty recreation and relaxation by the black airmen. Discrimination against the blacks by the local community was openly practiced.
2. The Human Relations Council had been relatively ineffective.
3. The serious lack of communication that existed between the young airmen, especially minority groups and supervisors, precluded the establishment of a satisfactory dialogue between them and base authorities.
4. The number and nature of grievances made by the black airmen, as well as the local civilian-community situation, contributed to the decision to conduct the demonstration.
5. The black airmen had experienced undue harassment both on and off duty.
6. Additional recreational and relaxation facilities and activities were needed.
7. Racism against the blacks had been practiced on base.

8. The percentage of black first-term to black career airmen at this base was considered to be inordinately high. The civilian-community situation and the relative isolation of the base presented a much greater problem to first-term airmen.

The human side of leadership.

While the specifics of each case listed above have been somewhat modified to depersonalize the example, they are all representative of problems which confront the Army today. They are likely to be with us in the future unless we are willing to acknowledge a human relations deficiency in the military organization and to take the necessary steps to educate ourselves about alternatives.

The ability to relate to others is important for any leader. To relate to others, the leader must first understand his own behaviors and motivations. Once he realizes how his own values, attitudes, and beliefs affect his behavior and learning, he can see more clearly how the beliefs, values and attitudes of others lead to behaviors which contribute to the attainment or non-attainment of organizational objectives. To be an effective organizational leader, a supervisor must know how the needs and aspirations of individuals influence the investment of their energies. Effectiveness as a person stems from the same understanding.

In addition to an understanding and concern for others, a leader must also be concerned with the motivation of subordinates to accomplish organizational goals. Additionally, he should be concerned with the integration of the needs of the individuals under his charge with the demands of the organization. Research by Mayo at Hawthorne (Chapter 5) showed that there is a direct correlation between the interpersonal atmosphere of the work environment and the attainment of organizational objectives (Henderson, 1974). The leader's skill in human relations establishes and maintains a climate in which organization members strive to achieve organizational objectives.

To provide more insight into human behavior, we will examine the concept of the individual. We will pay considerable attention to problem identification and treatment and the concept of self and how it affects individual behavior. We will then build on this insight into the individual to explore the relationship of the individual to the organization and to the group. After we review the impact of organizational and group dynamics on individual behavior, we will

examine more closely the leader's role in the organization and the group. Succeeding chapters concern with the human relations skills necessary for leaders to be successful in the military organizations, the history of the human relations movement, and some conclusions and implications for the military organization.

CHAPTER TWO

PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS -- CASE STUDIES

Case One: Specialist Jones

The tendency to treat the symptom of the human relations problem rather than to identify and treat the cause is common to both individuals and organizations. Undoubtedly the symptom is easier to identify than the cause. The case of Specialist Jones, recounted in Chapter 1, illustrates the difficulty in problem identification.

Jones was fortunate because his company commander was more concerned with Jones than with punishing deviant behavior. There are several points in this example at which a little human understanding could have eliminated the source of what finally grew into a personal crisis. The squad leader was so concerned with the immediate mission requirements that he ignored or overlooked the long-range benefits to the individual and the organization which could have resulted from allowing Jones to complete his education. Once the precedent of deferring individual needs to what appears in this case to be leader convenience had been established, it became increasingly easier to relegate individual needs to a subordinate position.

A second opportunity to resolve Jones' problem was lost when the platoon sergeant failed to find a way for Jones to complete his education. Yet another opportunity to demonstrate empathy was lost when the platoon leader used the possibility for education as a club to demand better job performance. The fact that Jones had been promised school opportunities for years without any visible effort having been made to meet those promises made the threat to withhold that education an empty, powerless one. The platoon leader did not understand his bases for power and grossly overestimated his coercive powers. This is confirmed by Jones' subsequent behavior.

Finally, the company leadership was negligent in its evaluation of individual needs. If the company commander had been aware of Jones' financial status and educational deficiencies, he could have taken action to either correct the educational deficiency or to modify the promotion criteria. The high school diploma requirement could have been waived, since Jones was serving in a position of a higher grade and performing the tasks associated with that position in a superior manner.

The application of human relations skills at any of the four points in the problem progression could have eliminated the cause of the problem. In the manipulation of promotion criteria, however, follow-up steps to insure that Jones completed his education would have to be made or Jones would be faced with the same problem the next time he came due for promotion.

The problem and its effect on the individual were clear in the case cited above. Less apparent are the organizational implications of the problem. Had the commander not referred Jones to the mental health clinic to determine the cause of his behavior, it is probable that Jones would have continued to vent his frustration in unacceptable behavior. The fact that the work capability of Jones had been damaged had already been acknowledged. A continued downward progression could have been expected. Punishment, either judicial or non-judicial could have eventually resulted in the ejection of Jones from the Army. The Army would then have to recruit and train a replacement if the organization was to continue in its capability to accomplish the task. Even then the organization would have been deprived of the experience Jones would have taken with him when he left the Army. Although the impact of the problem is more subtle on the organization than on the individual, it is no less real or important.

In the case of Specialist Jones, the basic cause of the problem was a lack of empathy on the part of supervisors for Jones' educational deficiencies. There are many other conditions which indicate human relations problems. When supervisors overemphasized mission requirements to the neglect of individual needs, many other problems are created through deficiencies in interpersonal relations. A case in point is that of Staff Sergeant Nada, a career noncommissioned officer.

Case Two: Staff Sergeant Nada

Admittedly the case of Staff Sergeant Nada is one of extremes. Nada's problem was that he allowed himself to become convinced that he had no worth as a person. When his professional reputation eroded within his primary group he found his organizational identity threatened. He was no longer the "super-gunner"; he became instead the "super-dud." Because his self-concept was based so completely on his organizational identity, when that identity eroded it caused problems with his family, the second most important group in his life. He perceived himself, with some coaxing from his wife, to be a lesser provider than his peers. This feeling of inadequacy struck at the

very heart of his male identity. His organizational problems made him persona non grata in the community, so he was excluded from that group. Eventually Staff Sergeant Nada perceived himself to be a non-person, totally worthless for anything, a waster of the very air he breathed. Since his problems followed him from one unit to another, he believed that further moves would not alter his situation. He was trapped in a situation from which there was no escape except through the termination of his existence. When the stress became too great, he exercised that option.

Certainly Nada's suicide was not the act of a rational, fully functional person. There were, however, points at which this self-destructive process could have been altered; where the progressive destruction of self-concept leading to eventual destruction of self could have been short-circuited.

The Peter Principle states that men are promoted to a level of incompetence. In Nada's case he was a superlative gunner but was totally unprepared for duties involving greater responsibility. The organization allowed his promotion to a position of responsibility without adequate preparation. The organization justified this promotion because there was a shortage of qualified personnel available to fill the job and on the unfounded assumption that if a person does well at one job he will do well in a different one. Experience has shown that most people rise to the challenge and perform at least adequately; Nada did not.

With the first professional failure came the opportunity to correct the situation. The platoon sergeant made the assumption that Nada possessed the necessary skills to perform his duties satisfactorily. That assessment proved to be incorrect. Rather than reevaluate his original assumption, the platoon sergeant chose to exercise coercive power to generate acceptable behaviors from Nada. Little or no attempt was made, however, to provide Nada with the knowledge or skills required to perform the task. Because he had inadequate skills, the harder Nada tried to meet expectations, the greater were his failures, which in turn generated more coercion from the platoon sergeant.

The platoon sergeant identified the substandard performance of Nada but inaccurately assessed its cause. His corrective action was therefore inappropriate because it was not directed toward the cause of Nada's inadequacy. When the corrective action proved ineffective, the platoon sergeant made an additional mistake in attacking Nada

personally rather than restricting himself to measures aimed at modification of behaviors.

As the problem escalated, the low-level supervisor was brought into the situation. The company commander saw Nada's poor performance and knew of his heavy drinking. Rather than investigating the situation thoroughly, he assumed that the drinking influenced the performance and took steps to eliminate what he considered to be the source of the problem. As in the case of the platoon sergeant, the company commander made a poor assessment of the situation and attacked the wrong target. He allowed Nada to provide no input of information upon which the commander could base an assessment. He had heard the platoon sergeant speak of Nada in derogatory terms. He saw what he had been conditioned to see, a drunken Mexican who was not performing his duties adequately. As with the platoon sergeant, the commander's corrective action altered the drinking behavior but compounded the problem by further depreciating Nada's self-concept.

Nada's peers missed a chance to stop the process of self-destruction. Rather than rally around him and offer him the benefit of their experience, they chose instead to avoid him, apparently in fear that the grief brought upon Nada might also be brought upon them if they stood too close.

The platoon sergeant got a second opportunity to help Nada, this time as his first sergeant. Instead of helping, he accepted his previous diagnosis and added to the problem by spreading word of Nada's inadequacy before Nada had an opportunity to join the new unit. The unit expected Nada to be inadequate, and Nada met those expectations.

Mrs. Nada contributed to the destruction of Staff Sergeant Nada's family self by venting her frustration and her disappointment on her spouse in unconstructive ways. With his professional self in ruin and with a non-existent community self, the family group represented the last bastion of successful self-identification. When that also crumbled, Nada lost his last shred of positive self-concept. The result was extreme but not unpredictable.

The points to be made from the case of Staff Sergeant Nada are these:

1. Leaders at all levels need to look beyond obvious behavior to identify causal factors.

2. If undesirable behavior continues, leaders must be prepared to admit that they may have made an error in diagnosis and reevaluate the problem.

3. Empathetic understanding is required at all levels of leadership. To accurately assess another person's problem, the leader must place himself in the other person's position and view the problem from different angles. The old adage that says there are two sides to every argument has a basis in fact.

4. When confrontation is necessary, leaders must confront the behavior and not attack the self-concept of the individual. If a man is told he is worthless frequently enough, at some point he begins to believe it.

5. Leaders should never accept a subordinate leader's evaluation of an individual's problem as the last word. Each leader brought into the problem should make his own assessment.

6. Leaders should not resort to gossip. Soldiers frequently can benefit from a change of unit. The leader who passes along an unsolicited performance appraisal to a gaining unit does both the individual and the organization a disservice.

In the case of Staff Sergeant Nada, an element of racism was induced into the problem. It appeared that when Nada was successful, that success was achieved in spite of his heritage. When he was unsuccessful, it was only to be expected from a Mexican. The commander who really believes that racism has been eliminated from the Army in general and his unit in particular probably has his head buried in the organizational sand. Racism is more subtle today than it was ten years ago, but it is still there, just waiting to explode and compound existing problems. The leader who denies the existence of racism is foolish, naive, a racist himself or a combination of the three. The establishment of any power hierarchy will be racially influenced.

Case Three: Major Phramus

Instances of alcoholism, spouse abuse, child abuse and other deviant behavior involving officers have become quite common occurrences. With the officer efficiency reporting system being what it is, a rating less than outstanding is considered a derogatory report, sure to slow or stop career progression during peacetime. In this environment an officer cannot make a mistake, especially one which

might reflect on his efficiency report. The result of the stress created by this situation could cause ethical decay in the officer corps. It creates a situation where an officer rates a subordinate officer on the subordinate's ability to conform to the values and standards of the rater. This translates into a hypothesis that subordinates can only be as ethical as their seniors will allow.

This point is clearly illustrated in a case involving the ethical problem faced by Major Phramus in dealing with the Unit Readiness Report. In this case there was a conflict between the ethical standards of Phramus and those of the organization as determined by the assistant division commander. This conflict generated a tremendous amount of stress for Phramus. Fortunately for him, the period of stress was relatively short. Long periods of stress have been proven to be contributing factors to serious physical maladies. The real damage was done indirectly to the organization. An excellent officer was brow-beaten into prostituting his ethical standards to satisfy organizational demands. Any thought of organizational righteousness was purged from Phramus' mind, to be replaced by a creeping cynicism and suspicion of organizational motives. It would be difficult to measure the effect of this disenchantment on the capability of the organization to properly function. The unwillingness of the assistant division commander to view the ethical problem from Phramus' point of view reflected poor human relations skills. He did not look out for the mental well-being of his subordinates nor did he enhance the division's real readiness condition. He did manage to enhance his own image at the expense of Phramus.

Several opportunities existed to alleviate the problems of Phramus. First of all, the battalion commander could have supported Phramus. He could have gone through his command channels to the division commander to solicit assistance in improving the unit's readiness posture. He was fearful for his command and his career, so he opted to let Phramus handle it on a staff level and to keep the command channels out of it.

The division operations officer could have interceded. He had the opportunity to view the report as it was intended to be viewed, an indication of the readiness posture of the battalion. Instead, he looked upon the report as a piece of paper which was tarnishing the reputation of the division. Since it was obvious that the assistant division commander wanted good reports, the operations officer was enticed into a situation where either the vehicle condition or the report had to be changed. Given the time constraints imposed by

report suspense dates, he chose the easier solution, the changing of the report.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity to prevent or to rectify the situation was presented to the assistant division commander. He was so intent on projecting an efficient, can-do image to his superiors that he allowed his ethical standards to slip. When he did this, he forced his subordinates to make choices between ethicality and careerism. There is little doubt that the decisions made in favor of careerism had unfavorable effects on the entire organization. The lowering of ethical standards perpetuated the situational ethic approach, which will ultimately be dysfunctional to the organization.

Case Four: Major Blank

Had Major Blank's drinking situation continued unchanged, it was quite possible that Blank could have joined Sergeant Nada at Fiddler's Green. Nature intervened, however. Blank passed out one day and was taken to the hospital, where he was found to be near death from hemorrhaging ulcers. While recuperating he had his first visit from the post psychiatrist and shortly thereafter began an extensive psychotherapy program.

It is obvious that Blank's problem progressed beyond the level where it could be resolved only with the help of human relations skills. As in previous cases, there were points at which outside intervention could have resolved the problem. Early exposure to units where manhood was measured by an ability to consume alcohol started Blank along his particular road to destruction. There must have been other symptoms indicating that Blank was stagnated in a late adolescent stage of development. Meaningful counseling by commanders to promote personal and professional growth could have helped Blank through this period. Like so many others, however, he was expected to acquire knowledge of self and group dynamics through osmosis. His early commanders believed, apparently, that maturity was a result of experience and time, and failed to recognize that sometimes an additional catalyst is required.

During Blank's second combat tour, his insecurity required alcoholic support in order for Blank to function adequately. Blank was overstepping his ability to cope. The fact that he became the subject of respect for his feats of valor increased rather than lessened his psychological load. Now Blank was forced to continue that

behavior in order to live up to what he considered to be largely an undeserved reputation.

Upon return to the United States after his second combat tour, Blank was no longer subjected to the constant pressures of combat and of living up to a reputation. He appeared to be better able to cope with his problems and relied less on alcohol to see him through difficult times. Counseling at this point could have been of great benefit to Blank, but no one diagnosed the symptoms as anything but the youthful exuberance of a "gung-ho tiger." The support of his primary group and the expanding influence of the family group might have been sufficient to assist him in recognizing his need for personal growth had not the third combat tour intervened.

When Blank's unit was notified of the impending deployment, Blank was dealt a severe blow. The unit commander was more concerned with manipulating Blank than he was in looking out for his welfare. Blank's insecurity problems surfaced again. He feared a return to combat, but was more afraid of peer reaction should he try to avoid it. He was convinced by his commander that the fate of the unit rested in his hands. To a person as insecure as Blank, he really had no choice. He had to accompany the unit.

It was at this point that Blank's external support began to crumble. The family group felt that Blank had rejected them and therefore grew more distant from him. A little communication could have prevented this deterioration of the family group, but Blank had been raised in a professional atmosphere which did not reward the admission of fears or weaknesses. This "macho" mania contributed to the destruction of the family group.

During Blank's recuperation he came to believe that he was really a fraud. His acts of valor had to him been simple reactions to terror. He continued to turn to alcohol to mask his feelings of inadequacy. His promotion to major seemed to him a gigantic practical joke on the Army. When he finally returned to duty he was given increased responsibilities for which he was ill-prepared. In addition he found that he was afraid to fly, sober or not. He could feel the flames of his last crash every time he approached the cockpit. It is not surprising that he did not meet the minimum hours of required flying. Alcohol continued to be his primary coping mechanism, especially after the family group dissolved completely. When the primary work group began withdrawing support, the situation appeared hopeless to Blank. Although he was given performance counseling at this point, no attempt

was made to dig deeper to unearth the causes of the deviant behavior. Even at this late juncture empathetic understanding could have provided significant help in overcoming Blank's problem, but, since no diagnosis had been made, no help could be offered.

It finally took extensive psychotherapy to assist Blank in restructuring his life and in rebuilding his self-concept. Perhaps that professional help had been required from the moment the drinking symptoms were recognizable. Unfortunately many commanders choose either to ignore the symptoms or to eliminate individuals from the system rather than to work with troubled persons. There is also a reluctance among many leaders to refer persons with problems to someone else, as if to do so would be to admit an inadequacy in themselves. This sort of thinking unquestionably contributed to the growth of Blank's problem to the proportions it finally achieved. It ultimately cost Blank his career and the Army an experienced officer.

In each of the cases investigated so far, the failure of meaningful human interaction resulted in harm being done to an individual. Organizational damage was at best indirect. The loss of a specialist, a sergeant, or a major has no real, long-term impact on an organization the size of the Army. The disenchantment of Phramus was probably more damaging to the Army than the loss of the individuals because Phramus remained in the system to promote disenchantment among others. Is trust and confidence in the organization and the individual necessary to insure the satisfactory functioning of the Army? That question could be the subject of a separate monograph. If we, the organization, preach the requirement for trust and confidence, then it is up to us to model those behaviors. This author can recall a series of lectures at the Command and General Staff College on the importance of trust and confidence in the officer corps. For the next examination, the same students who heard the lectures were required to sit at opposite ends of the table from each other to insure they could not cheat. The institution was clearly not practicing the trust and confidence it preached. Organizational integrity must be maintained if we are to prevent more cases like Phramus.

Case Five: Lieutenant Colonel Gross

It is, of course, possible that Lieutenant Colonel Gross was just a strong-willed officer who was content with himself, his job, and his situation and that he could see no logical reason for change. He may have honestly believed that as long as his weight hurt no one else and

did not hinder his ability to perform his job, he should be judged only on performance.

It is also possible that the overweight was a symptom of a lonely man who had been reduced to oral gratification as a primary means of achieving pleasure. The facts outlining this case did not present sufficient detail upon which an accurate diagnosis could be made. Using human relations skills, however, Gross's commander should perhaps have gone through a diagnostic process. Chronic overweight should have immediately triggered a warning sense. What did it mean? Was it an indication of laziness and sloth, or was it an indicator of a personality disorder which demands self-punishment through a burden of fat? Was food the last means of self-gratification left to the individual? What was the individual's self-concept? Certainly other questions need to be answered, but it was important that the commander find a satisfactory answer for each. Not to pursue the matter dooms the man to perpetual obesity, and because of his lower efficiency reports, would deprive the Army of a diligent, dedicated, capable officer who could be of great value to the organization. The commander who employed interpersonal skills (Chapter Four) would be able to help the individual and the organization, either by personal assistance or by referral of the person to an agency which can provide the necessary assistance.

There are additional benefits to be gleaned from humanistic response to the recognition of problem symptoms. The commander becomes known as a caring person, which opens communications much more effectively than directives. Other problems which have not yet generated sufficient stress to produce symptoms may be brought to light and treated. Interpersonal trust and confidence is facilitated as work atmosphere conducive to productivity is established and maintained. This can all be possible if a commander is willing to be a warm, open, caring individual with a genuine interest in the welfare of his subordinates.

Case Six: Lieutenant Silver

Lieutenant Silver was a young officer serving his initial obligatory tour. Airborne and Ranger qualified, Silver strove to project a tough, competent image. He was absolutely uncompromising in his beliefs. The commander insisted that Silver sit down and talk about the problem in his platoon and highlighted the accomplishments of the platoon and the improvements that had been made. The commander said that, in spite of outward appearances, he believed the platoon to be

less capable of performing its mission than when Silver joined the organization.

The commander was concerned about the fact that the platoon was divided into three factions: Silver, the platoon sergeant, and the rest of the platoon. The platoon members felt that they were being used as a toy with which the lieutenant could play. They resented being manipulated to fit what they considered to be unfair and unrealistic patterns. They felt that the lieutenant was building a reputation at their expense.

The noncommissioned officers resented Silver doing their jobs. They felt that Silver was unreceptive to their ideas and suggestions and was generally unapproachable. They never knew why things were being done. The platoon sergeant had an additional problem. He had to support the lieutenant and try to satisfy the needs of the platoon. His attempts to approach the lieutenant had been as unsuccessful as those of the other noncommissioned officers.

The result of this disharmony had been the absolute destruction of morale and teamwork in the platoon. If the lieutenant did not wish to lose control of his platoon, he needed to re-evaluate the situation and improve his communication and interpersonal relations with his subordinates and peers.

The commander discussed interpersonal communications, consideration, empathy, mission requirements, and methods for getting the job done. He spoke of trust and confidence and he explained classical versus task approach management theories (Chapter Five). He dwelt heavily on group processes and dynamics. Silver asked questions as the discussion progressed. The commander was not, as Silver realized, chastizing him; he was attempting to teach Silver a more effective way to accomplish his mission. Silver listened and he learned. He did not agree with everything the commander said, but he began to see some overall merit in what the captain had to say. At the conclusion of the discussion he was determined to try a more humanistic approach to mission accomplishment. He vowed to start by making peace with his platoon sergeant so he could benefit more fully from his vast store of practical experience.

We do not know how Lieutenant Silver will develop in the course of his career. We do know that as a platoon leader he was able to work his way into the primary group. He did establish communications with the platoon members and he was receptive to feedback. He was

able to separate the important from the unimportant and to better prioritize tasks. He also found that when he made a mistake, the platoon rallied to his defense. He was surprised to see no discernible slips in discipline in his unit. Openness in his dealings and a willingness to pass along reasons for performing tasks appeared to help in getting the job done better and faster. Silver probably would have laughed if he were told he was becoming a human relations specialist, but the truth was that he was learning and practicing human relations skills. He was also finishing each day with a feeling of satisfaction, something which had been absent before.

Of course, if the situation had turned out badly for Lieutenant Silver, the example would not be contained in this monograph. There is a difference between exercising human relations skills and becoming a warm and fuzzy pushover, ripe for manipulation. A leader must constantly assess the situation and make those adjustments necessary to meet both the valid needs of the troops and the demands of the organization.

Case Seven: Race Relations

For years race relations have been viewed as a separate problem requiring a specialized bag of tricks. This concept is not correct. Race relations are nothing more than interpersonal, or human relations. The same skills and processes are applicable to all human interactions. Communication is still required; understanding (to include ethnic or cultural considerations) and empathy are still mandatory. The fact that racism exists in the society from which the military establishment is drawn guarantees that racism will also exist in the Army. The elimination of racism can be facilitated through a positive education program, the development of human relations skills, and the use of referent power (Chapter 3). Leaders at all echelons must model behavior which clearly discourages racism.

There is no shortage of cases in which the breakdown in interpersonal relations have racial overtones. In selecting a case, the author attempted to select one involving personnel of a different service (to lessen the threat) and one which encompassed as many levels of supervision as possible. That the case be documented was also a consideration viewed to be important. J. L. Dansby provided just such an example in his evaluation of "Race Relations at Base X," an Air Force base in the midwest. Nearly one thousand Air Force personnel and civilian supervisors were interviewed, and the following conclusions were made (Dansby 1975):

1. This installation is unique in that there is absolutely no black community nor a section of town for off-duty recreation and relaxation by the black airmen. Discrimination against the blacks by the local community was openly practiced.
2. The Human Relations Council had been relatively ineffective.
3. The serious lack of communication that existed between the young airmen, especially minority groups and supervisors, precluded the establishment of a satisfactory dialogue between them and base authorities.
4. The number and nature of grievances made by the black airmen, as well as the local civilian-community situation, contributed to the decision to conduct the demonstration.
5. The black airman has experienced undue harassment both on and off duty.
6. Additional recreational and relaxation facilities and activities were needed.
7. Racism against the blacks had been practiced on base.
8. The percentage of black first-term to black career airmen at this base was considered to be inordinately high. The civilian community situation and the relative isolation of the base presented a much greater problem to first-term airmen.

From these conclusions the study made the following recommendations to the commander:

1. Positive action at all levels be initiated to persuade the civilian community in the area to implement existing nondiscriminatory and fair-treatment laws "in fact and in spirit."
2. Military regulations against discrimination be rigidly enforced.

3. Personnel assignment policies for single, first-term airmen be reexamined with a view toward minimizing the number of black first-term personnel assigned to this installation.
4. The commander be provided specific recommendations for elimination or reduction of all irritants.
5. A race-relations awareness course geared first toward top management and supervisory levels be instituted, the class to be made up of peers.
6. A full-time, equal-opportunity officer be assigned to the base. Criteria, duties, and responsibilities of this individual are outlined below:

The individual appointed this position must be perceptive and sensitive to social problems and possess the desire to serve in the human relations field. He must also possess a temperament and personality that will enable him to relate to people. He must have a recognized capability for solving problems without being dominated by executive or administrative authority. The EOO will serve as the commander's personal representative on all matters associated with the Equal Opportunity Program. He will insure that the program within each unit is aggressive and positive. He should be permitted easy access to, and maintain close liaison with, the senior installation commander. His office will serve as the focal point for matters pertaining to equal and fair treatment of military personnel. He will also assist the commander in completing the semi-annual, equal-opportunity status report.

7. An effective Human Relations Council be established. The council will be composed of a cross section of assigned and permanent personnel....The functions of the Human Relations Council are:

a) To provide a forum to inquire into and make recommendations with respect to complaints and grievances arising from official or unofficial activities.

b) To research, analyze, and recommend appropriate preventive measures to commander concerning implementation of the principle of equal opportunity and to provide a vigorous program of education through every available medium.

c) To serve as a sounding board for providing the commander information about the degree of racial hostility or tension.

d) To take an active part in social-action problem identification and solving.

e) To explore and develop new ideas, concepts, and programs that will lead to a more harmonious relationship between the races.

8. A general awareness and firm action program be developed. The senior installation commanders will:

a) When reviewing the Human Relations and Equal Opportunity minutes, make specific references as appropriate to include actions to be taken, his concurrence, nonconcurrence, and rationale.

b) Lend full support to personnel he appoints to investigate complaints, grievances, and so on.

c) Insure that administrative discharges are not used as a substitute for actions that could otherwise be corrected through sound leadership and management practices.

d) Encourage and practice a true open-door policy at each echelon of command to facilitate the identification and remedy of unequal treatment, whether real or imagined. This policy must be flexible enough to accommodate personnel who work irregular hours, such as shift workers.

e) Establish realistic equal-opportunity and human relations goals and objectives for his installation.

f) Establish procedures to insure that the Social Action Office or EOO is apprised of formal complaints submitted under other channels when it is clearly evident that the matter is related to EO or human relations.

g) Insure that during initial in-processing newly assigned personnel are advised of local policies regarding equal opportunity.

h) Insure that one person in every squadron or detachment, other than the commander, will act as EO liaison officer or NCO, as appropriate, who will work closely with the parent organization equal-opportunity officer.

i) Insure greater participation of all groups in planning recreation and entertainment programs to assure broad appeal. Commanders will insure that applicable councils represent the clientele they serve.

j) Insure that military justice will be firmly and impartially applied when circumstances warrant such action. Race or minority status will not enter any consideration for punishment. There must be no possibility that disciplinary action is being taken, or not taken, for any reason other than the facts warranting that action. Commanders will publicize punishments under Article 15, UCMJ/Court Martial through such vehicles as unit bulletin boards, daily bulletins, and newspapers, after removal of the name of the member concerned. Statistics will be maintained by SJA on the number of individuals administered punishment under the UCMJ to include charges, convictions, and punishment, and will be broken out by rank and race, that is, blacks, whites, Spanish-Americans, and so on.

9. A management training program be developed to expose managers at all levels to the philosophy and techniques of modern-day management principles such as those of Maslow, Hersey-Blanchard, and Gellerman. The general purpose of this program will be to develop more

enlightened, better-prepared, and better-organized managers. Course material will at the minimum include the following:

- a) Behavioral approach to management.
- b) Human relations movement.
- c) Motivation and behavior.
- d) Supervisory styles.
- e) Management philosophies.
- f) Communication.
- g) Motivating environment.
- h) Leader behavior.
- i) Determination of effectiveness.
- j) Management for organizational effectiveness.

10. A Career Advancement Program (CAP) be developed. This will be a free-of-charge, 1-duty educational program for personnel who need reinforcement in the basic communicative skills - reading, writing, mathematics, and so on. These courses will be taught on an individual basis. Class size will be kept to such that will allow for personal attention of the instructor to each student to identify the specific area in which he indicates a weakness.

This author visited the base several times both during and after the remedial program was initiated by the commander. Intragroup human relations skills had been very effective. Communication had been reestablished with all levels of supervision, and it was apparent that supervisors were accepting feedback in the spirit in which it was intended. Intergroup skills had also made considerable inroads in to the problem, but there was still some evidence of sectional rivalry, the "we-them" syndrome. Intergroup relations based on ethnic or racial considerations had made great progress. There was much primary group cohesiveness. There still was an atmosphere of racial tension

in the air. Although speech and actions were closely monitored by all levels of command, the feeling was one of repression rather than extinction of racism.

Extra-group relations should be classified as unsatisfactory. The surrounding community, almost totally without a minority group of its own, treated blacks and other minorities with distrust. Off-post social opportunities, especially those involving local females, were extremely limited, in spite of a spirited campaign by the post commander and other senior commanders. The community remained ultra-conservative and progress was very slow.

The notable point from this example is the attitude of the commander. Although diagnostic mechanisms were initially lacking, once the problem was recognized he did not consider himself personally threatened and adopt repressive measures; rather, he vigorously investigated the allegations, discovered additional problems, and instituted a far-reaching program to correct or ease the problem. More important, he established a mechanism by which continuous reassessment of the situation could be made, thereby reducing the probability of future human relations problems. Both minority and majority numbers benefited equally from these actions. This case should be considered a good example of what can be accomplished by a commander who understands the importance of human relations to mission accomplishment and troop welfare.

PART II

HUMAN RELATIONS

IN

THEORY

CHAPTER THREE

LEVELS OF HUMAN RELATIONS

Delimitations

This chapter will examine human relations at three levels. First to be explored will be individual relations--one person as he relates to himself and to others. The second level will be the individual as he relates to others in the organizational setting--specifically, the soldier as he relates to others in the Army. The last level is the leader as a human relations practitioner.

The Individual

A study of the individual as he relates to himself and others is really a study of the self-concept. Self-concept is the feeling an individual has about himself. This feeling is based on how the individual perceives his abilities, worth, and significance in society. The more positively the individual regards himself in these areas, the greater is his self-concept. Argyris (1964) states that the "...operational criterion of self-acceptance is the ability to send and receive information...with minimum distortion...the greater the self-esteem, the less the tendency for distortion that is 'internally created.'"

The individual's measures of his abilities, worthiness, and significance are perceptions which are not necessarily objective, accurate appraisals of fact. In The Republic, Plato's shadow-on-the-wall theory stated that truth for an individual was actually his perception of events. For the man who had viewed life only from a shadow cast on the wall, reality was the shadow; not the object which cast the shadow.

Man's self-concept is based on how he sees himself; therefore, if he views himself negatively, that perception will become a self-fulfilling prophecy and will be reflected in his behavior and job performance. This will further reinforce his negative self-image. He can never objectively know his environment. He will see what his self permits him to see. Similarly, positive feedback on behaviors and job performance enhance self-perceptions and increase self-concept.

Self-concept affects behavior in different ways. High self-concept individuals are more willing to risk disapproval from

superiors and peers, less easily swayed in their views, and more comfortable with their decisions than low self-concept people. Low self-concept people are more likely to adopt the attitude of "don't rock the boat, don't make waves" and to avoid situations which would appear to buck the system and incur supervisor displeasure. It also appears that high anxiety levels, deviant behavior, poor academic achievement and greater probabilities for adult psychological problems are significantly correlated with low self-concept. Members of minority groups who have been subjected to discriminatory treatment can be expected to fall into the group exhibiting socially deviant behavior. In this instance the low self-concept is a process of socialization.

Self-concept is important to the military leader because it influences his own behavior and that of the people with whom he works. An understanding of the impact of self-concept on behavior and an ability to determine accurately an individual's self-concept will allow the leader to better predict individual behavior. Greenfield and Poch (1975) give an excellent visual depiction of the influence of self-concept on the classic theory of behavior in Figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1. Self-Concept in the Classic Theory of Behavior Model

Research findings show that self-concept is relatively stable over time. A person with a low self-concept now probably has had a similar self-concept earlier and will maintain that concept in the future unless he makes a concerted effort to change it.

If everyone who entered the Army was high in self-concept, there would be fewer disturbances in interpersonal relations. However, many low and marginal self-concept persons exist in society as a whole and probably enter the armed forces. Leaders must be able to identify self-concept levels in subordinates and manage low self-concept people

differently from those with high self-concepts. It is possible to improve one's self-concept if a concerted effort is made by both the leader and the individual. A marginal or low self-concept person can be given tasks which are within his capabilities. A history of satisfactory job performance will tend to increase his feelings of worthiness, significance and personal competence, all of which increase the self-concept. Argyris (1964) states that self-concept "...is developed by dealing with the world competitively in such a way that a person can assign the solution of the problems to himself, to his abilities, to his efforts, to his work." Continued positive feedback causes one to gradually internalize feelings of adequacy and leads to enhanced self-concept.

The leader can give to high self-concept people tasks in which there are high risks for failure and high rewards for accomplishment. Failure will not significantly affect the high self-concept person, but failure could have serious regressive effects on the marginal or low self-concept individual. For that reason, a leader should be aware of self-concept when analyzing tasks and assigning personnel to accomplish them. Additional task structuring may be required to better the chances of success for low self-concept persons. Low self-concept persons may select high or low-risk goals. The low-risk goals are easy to achieve, and the low self-concept person feels that he cannot be blamed for failure to achieve a high-risk goal that is, at least to him, obviously unattainable. High self-concept persons generally select realistic, moderate goals.

Maslow has suggested that man moves toward self-actualization by satisfying a hierarchy of needs. Goble (1970) lists these as:

- (1) Physiological needs - those which are required for survival of the race (satisfaction of hunger, thirst, sex).
- (2) Safety needs - those which are necessary for security and safety.
- (3) Belonging needs - those which provide identification and love.
- (4) Esteem needs - those which provide success, self respect and which contribute to self-concept.
- (5) Growth needs - those needs for beauty, etc., which garnish life.




Figure 3-2. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.

Kelly (1969) shows in Figure 3-3 how need attainment impacts on personal development.




Figure 3-3. Personal Development.

The reduction of tension in turn changes the needs of the individual and he continues to move toward self-actualization as the cycle is repeated. It would seem that the self-actualized person is a person with a very high self-concept.

Research has shown that persons with low levels of self-actualization are carriers of low morale and are likely to pass it on to others. Persons in the higher levels of actualization hierarchy are apparently immune to infection by low morale.

An individual's self-concept significantly influences how a person acts, how he accomplishes a task, how readily he accepts responsibility for his actions and the actions of others, and how willing he is to seek out difficult assignments. Self-concept is an important factor in interpersonal relations. An insensitive supervisor or peer can do grave damage to a low or marginal self-concept person which will be reflected in the individual's ability to work productively and to coexist with others. An illustration of this principle is the incessant taunting of a child by his peers for a real or imagined failure, which eventually results in the taunted child's withdrawing or being drawn from the group. A supervisor who irresponsibly taunts a subordinate denies that subordinate self-esteem and the esteem of others, which lowers his self-concept. The supervisor should not be surprised to find one day that the subordinate has left the group, absenting himself without leave. Who would be the culprit in this case, the supervisor or the subordinate?

We can infer from the preceding discussion that high self-concept individuals also have high achievement levels. They are able to identify their own goals as they are related to their needs and values. These goals represent realistic levels of aspiration. They have

self-control and are committed to task accomplishment. They know and use their capabilities fully.

This does not mean, however, that low self-concept persons cannot be high achievers. There are other external motivations for achievement which could effectively mask low self-concept. A low self-concept person may seek power to provide the illusion of confidence and high self-concept. History is replete with such men, the classical example being Adolph Hitler (Greenfield and Poch, 1975).

The masking of low self-concept by the acquisition of power often proves to be of value to both the organization and the individual; tremendous organizational accomplishments have been achieved by low self-concept persons in the process of masking. General George Patton, Jr. exhibited many of the behaviors characteristic of those persons who have and mask a low self-concept. Certainly no one would say in retrospect that General Patton's rise through the organizational structure to a position of power during World War II adversely affected this nation's capability to wage war. Therefore, masking per se is not necessarily negative when viewed in terms of organizational goals.

Leaders should remember that high self-concept persons tend to be free-thinking, analytical, critical and tolerant of changes--characteristics which are not greatly rewarded or encouraged in a maximum decision-making environment. The high self-concept person may feel stifled in the military and compelled to leave the service. Supervisors must insure that their actions do not force from the system those high and low self-concept personnel which the organization can ill-afford to lose. Organizational development requires the innovation and drive furnished by these individuals. Without these qualities the military subsociety may lag behind the progressive changes of the society from which it is drawn.

The Individual in the Organization

The institution in which the work function is accomplished has a profound effect on the individual. This institution may be a private corporation or a public service. It is the structure of the institution or lack of it, and the interaction with others which impact on the individual. Clark (1964) made an interesting study of what he called the "total institutions"--those organizations which exert a high degree of control on the people in them. Among these institutions he listed mental hospitals, prisons, boarding schools, officer

cadet schools, and the military establishment. A common characteristic of all these institutions is the high degree of structuring in social patterns. Other common characteristics are:

1. Psychological isolation from outside influences.
2. Denial of previous social or educational differences among the members.
3. A stripping of those things which gave the individual identity to the members.
4. A common mode of dressing.
5. The use of a private or organizational jargon.
6. A system of rewards and punishments which is unique to the organization.
7. A system of special roles for members and supervisors.

All organizations are complex systems. Each organization is composed of human activities on many levels. Argyris (1964) states that "...Personalities, small groups, intergroups, norms, values, attitudes, all seem to exist in an extremely complex multidimensional pattern. The complexity seems...almost beyond comprehension. Yet it is this very complexity that is...the basis for understanding the organizational phenomena...." To optimize human productivity, he says, the organization must consider individual needs, attitudes, values, and feelings; group attractiveness, goals, processes, and norms; organizational policies related to power, rewards, penalties, communication, and work patterns; and informal activities such as apathy, shirking, inter-organizational conflict, conformity, and mistrust.

Job Satisfaction

Everyone exists in several subsocieties or sub-cultures. The work organization is one of these subsocieties. The organization influences what the individual desires, how he goes about trying to achieve those desires, and the success or failure has on his ability to achieve subsequent goals. Many organizations, including the military, achieve excellence by adopting the classical management model of molding the man to fit the machine, requiring him to perform

a limited number of functions a very large number of times. The difference between the work role and the personality of the individual generates conflict between the man and the organization. Kelly (1969) states that from this conflict emerges expressions such as:

"Nobody is indispensable."

"You just can't win."

"If you can't beat them, join them."

"Do your job and mind your own business."

"Carry out orders and complain afterwards."

This feeling of inadequacy results in a feeling of being manipulated. Argyris (1964) equates psychological success to achievement of challenging goals. It is clear that the classical management model does not constitute an environment conducive to the achievement of such goals.

Job satisfaction hinges on control of one's working environment and the ability to use one's talents. The inability to alter one's working environment becomes greater the lower one is in the chain of command. The shop floor worker or the private soldier has little or no chance to achieve self-actualization in his working environment. Goble (1970) states that self-actualization is an act of faith by management and an impossibility for shop floor labor. At the private soldier level, the soldier focuses on earning a living as well as on the psychological satisfaction he can get from military service. The possibility for a diminished self-concept is tremendous.

There is a greater dissatisfaction with the working environment at lower levels in the organization. Table 3-1 shows the responses of workers and managers to a survey which asked the question, "I wish my job had more...."

From the responses, it is evident that the shop floor workers found their work less interesting than did the managers. Nearly half of both managers and workers felt that their capabilities were not being fully used. More than half of the managers and workers felt that they were unable to progress on the job. These last two feelings are certain to kindle a feeling of frustration and job dissatisfaction which could have serious consequences for the organization.

Opportunity Cluster	Percentage Base		
	Unit K		
	Managers (34)	Hourly Workers (575)	Points Difference
1. Work that is interesting	20%	46%	+26
2. Variety in the work I do	12	29	+17
3. Feeling it is worthwhile to really pitch in	32	44	+12
4. Chance to work with more than petty problems	26	38	+12
5. Chance to learn new things	44	54	+10
6. Getting a real kick out of my job	35	44	+ 9
7. Chance to argue things out to a productive conclusion	29	37	+ 8
8. Solving problems on my own	23	25	+ 2
9. Making important decisions	29	31	+ 2
10. Chance for greater respon- sibility	41	42	+ 1
11. Making the most of my capacities	47	45	- 2
12. Feeling I am helping people	41	37	- 4
13. Feeling I am getting somewhere	62	56	- 6

Table 3-1. Unfulfilled Needs*

* Carnarius (1962, p 13)

In transferring this job satisfaction theory to the specifics of the military environment, it is clear the same possibilities for job dissatisfaction exist in the military. The armor crewman who spends half of each working day in the motor pool tightening end connectors and performing other maintenance chores is not using his full capabilities. After a given point he can see no level of achievement. No matter how well he tightens the bolt, he knows he is going to be doing the same job the next day, probably on the same equipment. The clerk spends his day completing forms, the driver traversing the same route, and the worker filling orders in a warehouse: All these men will soon reach a point when the task becomes routine and ceases to present a challenge. Intellectual stagnation and boredom can result.

Frankl (1959) states that boredom is the greatest neurosis of our time. Meaning or a clear goal is essential for man's continued existence. In a work environment which generates boredom, it is obvious that this meaning or goal must be found outside the work environment. In the military, this goal or meaning in life frequently becomes the termination of association with the organization, either through enlistment completion, retirement, or desertion.

Argyris (1960) believes that most human problems in organizations are the result of mentally healthy people participating in work situations which coerce them into becoming dependent, subordinate, submissive entities using few of their abilities. Formal organization, technology, directive leadership, and managerial control all combine to make the individual dependent and subordinate. Healthy persons find this condition frustrating and react in one or more of the following ways:

1. By leaving the organization (AWOL, desertion, ETS).
2. By climbing in the organizational structure.
3. By becoming defensive (low self-concept, regression, projection, aggression).
4. By becoming apathetic.
5. By turning to the informal group, the peers.
6. By unionizing.
7. By replacing values of self-importance and creativity with values of monetary and material rewards.

8. By accepting organizational behavior as appropriate behavior outside the organization.

Many private businesses have begun to employ full-time counselors to assist employees in dealing with problems and to provide feedback to management concerning those aspects of the organization which cause employee problems. The Army does not have a well organized, viable counseling program for the private soldier. Except for severe psychological problems, the soldier generally receives counseling from within the chain of command. The skill with which this counseling is performed will largely determine whether the soldier will be able to overcome his problem and remain in the organization as a fully functioning member, or be rejected from the organization for non-productivity.

Every leader in the armed forces can remember a supervisor who took pride in his or her ability to administer a tough "chewing out." This "chewing out" frequently took the place of performance counseling and amounted to degrading the recipient's feeling of self-worth by attacking him as a person, rather than by concentrating on the job performance or behavior which generated the counseling. We have examined the impact of self-concept on job performance. It is not difficult to project that continuous, poorly administered performance counseling will have great impact on the self-concept of the recipient. If his self-concept is high, such counseling will probably reinforce his goal to leave the organization, although his short-term job performance may improve sufficiently to keep his supervisor at a distance. If his self-concept is low or marginal, it may further lower both his self-concept and his job performance. Thus the tough supervisor's unskilled counseling techniques may achieve short-term performance improvement, but to the detriment of the individual's and the organization's long-term interests. Those leaders who smile and say, "old George can really give a chewing out" reinforce such behavior, and in the long run they are damaging the organization.

Figure 3-4 shows the relationships among self-concept, job satisfaction, and counseling.




Figure 3-4. Impact of Counseling on the Individual in the Organization.

The military organization differs from civilian counterparts in many ways, including methods of employee retention. If a worker feels stifled, bored, or unproductive in a corporation, he is free to terminate his employment. The soldier cannot terminate under similar conditions, although both the employee and the soldier volunteered for employment in their respective organizations. The soldier commits himself to a three- or four-year period of employment without full knowledge of the conditions under which he will be working. If he finds these conditions to be incompatible with his own values, he is precluded by law from terminating his employment. For this reason the military organization has a moral obligation to meet the worker's needs and to assist him in achieving meaningful goals. There is a greater obligation for organizational understanding of individual needs in the military than in industry. This is because the terms of military service are enforced and the soldiers are generally younger, less mature, and in greater need of empathetic understanding and guidance. A military supervisor may insist his teenage son live at home because of his immaturity and need for parental guidance, yet the supervisor will incarcerate a soldier of the same age for demonstrating behaviors similar to those of his offspring. The empathy demonstrated by the military supervisor to his son must be fostered by the organization for the soldier.

Indik, et al, (1961) found in their study of 1000 individuals in 27 organizations that there was a significant positive correlation between high job performance and satisfaction and the following:

- (1) A relatively high degree of mutual understanding of other's viewpoints and problems among members of the work group.

(2) A high degree of local influence and autonomy on work-related matters.

(3) Open communications between workers and supervisors.

It would appear that the organization which fosters this environment will be more successful than the organization which does not. Empathetic understanding, absence of oversupervision, and unimpeded channels for feedback are essential for organizational and personal success as measured by goal achievement.

It is easy for the military leader to believe that these criteria have been met. However, this complacency probably is largely unjustified. Empathetic understanding of personal needs and problems constantly require command attention. Sensitivity to needs of the individual can be easily numbed to the point of ineffectiveness. "The mission at all costs" frequently becomes the unofficial motto in military units where rewards and other positive reinforcements are based largely on mission accomplishment. Eventually this attitude will affect the capability of personnel to accomplish tasks. Poor performance or nonperformance in turn will result in tightened restrictions and punishments. It also leads to closer supervision.

Supervision

Supervision has become progressively tighter in the Army of the past two decades. Where officers once left first-level supervision to first-line supervisors, they are now compelled or choose to closely supervise the most routine activities by a system which rewards such behavior. The division commander who incessantly checks tire pressures has little time to do more than check tire pressures. Worse still, each level of supervision between the division commander and the soldier spends a great deal of its productive time checking tire pressures and allows more important, satisfying work to be left undone. Lower levels of supervision are pushed out of the supervisory chain to become either additional workers or spectators. Efforts to upgrade the meaningfulness of noncommissioned officer positions are attempts to rectify this situation. An example of oversupervision occurred during the Viet Nam War, when levels of command could be identified by the altitude of command and control helicopters circling a fire fight. The problem was not with the leaders being forward to see the combat situation first hand. The problem arose when these commanders were unable to resist the temptation to bypass the chain of command and maneuver the ground elements themselves. This was known by the harrassed leader on the ground as "vertical leadership."

Oversupervision is an inevitable result in organizations which do not allow opportunities for subordinates to make mistakes. When the organization demands error-free performance and when promotion depends on error-free performance, oversupervision becomes a fact of life. Organizations must provide the opportunity for lower level supervisors and workers to try and, occasionally, to fail without destroying their careers.

An unimpeded channel for feedback is another major requirement for individual satisfaction and success in the organizational structure. Intelligence is not necessarily a function of rank and length of service. Experience does not necessarily help a leader to choose the proper course of action. A problem arises when the concepts of intelligence and experience become confused. Thoughts, ideas, and expressions of perceived problems cannot be shut off from the management of an organization without having long-term detrimental effects on the capability of the organization to realize its goals. Open door policies to help provide this feedback in the Army have long been required at every level of command. They are effective only so long as all the doors for communication or feedback are open and can be reached without obstacles. The company commander, for instance, who announces an open door policy can receive feedback only as long as the soldier does not first have to go through the squad leader, platoon sergeant, platoon leader, and first sergeant. The commander may not be the force requiring the soldier to stop at each supervisory level; it could be any supervisor in the chain of command. Leaders at all levels must strive to keep this line of interorganizational communication open and freely functioning.

Management and the Individual

Management theories differ, running the gamut from classical management through human relations management to task approach management (see Chapter 5). For each type of management the employee must exhibit different behaviors. In a classical management model, employees tend to be submissive and dependent on the organization. The worker uses few of his important abilities. If he is motivated by psychological success or personal growth, he will be frustrated and in conflict with the organization. In his attempt to maintain employment in the organization, the individual will either accept frustration and conflict as inevitable and become apathetic, or he may seek to modify the work environment through adaptive behaviors, such as absenteeism, job turnover, work quota restriction, shirking, slowdowns, union membership, materialism, dehumanization, noninvolvement, withdrawal from work, and alienation. Hostile employees resist cooperation with

and responsibility toward the organization and its goals. Apathetic employees do not resist; neither do they contribute. They just "put in their twenty" and retire.

The implications of the classical management model in the military establishment are many. Social norms seem to be moving away from the values associated with classical management. Because the Army draws its manpower from the general society, it is unrealistic to use classical methods in the organizational structure of the Army and expect to have a satisfied and efficient working force.

The human relations approach toward military management has proven to be inadequate in its two most recent applications. During the Korean War, United States forces presumably were organized along human relations management lines and were pitted against an enemy organized according to classical management model. The human relations approach helped to shape an organization which was unable to achieve success against an enemy force drawn from a classical management society and organized along classical management lines. The Army eventually reverted to the classical management model. Following the Viet Nam War, the Army again attempted the human relations approach with poor results. Discipline declined, oversupervision ran rampant, soldiers were in conflict with the organization and the capability of the Army to accomplish its goals was greatly diminished. Instead of reverting to classical management principles, the Army moved in a direction which is very similar to the task approach management model.

The task approach management model specifies that the organization is the instrument through which technical, economic, and human resources are combined to accomplish a task. The goals of the people and the organization coincide as much as possible to facilitate maximum exploration of human abilities and interests. Kelly (1969) gives an illustration of the relationship between the task and available resources in Figure 3-5:




Figure 3-5. Relationship Between Task and Resources.

As Argyris (1964) states, "We are interested in developing neither an overpowering manipulative organization nor organizations that will 'keep people happy.'...Individual competence, commitment, self-responsibility, fully functioning individuals and active, viable, vital organizations will be the kinds of criteria that we will keep foremost in our minds."

The Group

The individual is greatly influenced by the organization, its structure, and its managerial philosophy. Within the organization, however, the individual finds another influence. This influence is the group.

The term "group" was defined by Kelly (1969) when he stated that it was:

...an assembly of two or more people who bear an explicit psychological relationship to one another. It is useful to think of a group as a network of relations within which roles emerge. Groups consist of two or more people who meet requirements of interdependence and also share an ideology. The members are interdependent, which is...to say that each person's behavior influences the behaviors of the other members of the group. Inevitably...the members develop an ideology which implies that they have a common set of values, beliefs, and norms which regulates their behaviors and attitudes. This group ideology is developed as the groups work on particular tasks, and may become peculiar to the group.

Most people disclaim interest in the three topics of class, status, and group membership. They will disclaim interest in spite of

the fact that man spends his existence in groups, starting with the family group in which he is a junior member and progressing through school groups, athletic teams, military service, the work group and culminating in a family group in which he is a senior member.

Group membership involves a socialization process created through a series of events which undo or modify old individual values so that new values can be adopted. Organizational and group values are added to or substituted for individual values through events to produce the member values shown in Figure 3-6.




Figure 3-6. Formation of Member Values.

The process of socialization which molds member values is not always pleasant. Organizational and group values may not agree with each other, which adds a degree of conflict and stress to the value development process. Member values are more heavily influenced by group than by organizational values; conflict between the two tends to be resolved in favor of group values unless an outside factor, such as a sanction, is introduced. Organizational pressure through sanctions can become so strong that the individual rejects or is rejected by the group.

Group pressure for individual conformity to group values is substantial and constant. If conformity to a single opinion is important for the group, the group will exert whatever pressure is required to bring this conformity about in order to maintain the reality of that value. Groups have a variety of rewards for conformity to their values, especially expressions of esteem and acceptance. Groups

punish nonconformity with sanctions ranging from pointed comments to physical violence and ejection from the group.

The process of joining a group requires considerable effort for both the individual and the group. The group must become receptive to adding a new member. Questions essential to the group admitting a new member concern individual identification (who is the individual), background data (what has he done and where has he been), present and future plans (to what does the individual aspire), and authority identification (who the individual knows who is a member of this or a similar group). The individual must be prepared to adopt new ideas or values in conforming to group norms. Normally some sort of group initiation is required, ranging from pranks perpetrated by fraternity brothers to seemingly endless rotation training which may appear to be designed to insure the new member does not have a fixed role. An example of this is the newly commissioned officer who attends his basic branch school. He then may attend airborne or ranger training. He finally joins a unit where he is trained in the specifics of his trade until he demonstrates sufficient proficiency to be accepted by his peers as a member of the unit. In this way the new member is slowly accepted into the primary group.

Primary groups are those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation which are fundamental in forming the social structure and ideals of the individual (Cooley, 1909). They are considered to be an important part of all organizations. The functions of the primary group include the following (Kelly, 1969):

1. Providing emotional support for group members.
2. Facilitating horizontal communication.
3. Defining standards of performance.
4. Allowing role specialization.
5. Creating value systems.
6. Specifying acceptable norms.
7. Specifying sanctions for breach of standards, values and norms.

8. Exhibiting functional autonomy, i.e., after the original reason for the creation of the group has passed, the group will create new needs to exploit the social capital that it has generated.

Conflict between group functions and organizational functions is bound to occur. Standards of performance, for instance, may be resolved in favor of the group or the organization, or it may be resolved through compromise, where both the group and the organization agree to change their standards.

Every group generates dynamics. These group dynamics are adjustments in the group as a whole produced by changes in any part of the group. Group dynamics includes the acquisition of knowledge concerning the nature of groups; how groups are developed; and effects of groups on individuals, other groups, and the organization.

The importance of active group membership and identification in the military is illustrated by Janowitz (1963) in the following extract:

In a study of some 70 tactical episodes of operation Neptune, the airborne phase of the Normandy invasion, it was found that only a minor fraction was successful if the original unit was disrupted during the drop. If an officer or a noncommissioned officer collected a group of men he had never commanded and tried to lead them into battle, the results were almost uniformly unsatisfactory. The same observations were made from a study of battle stragglers in the Ardennes operation; individual stragglers had little combat value when put into a strange organization....

There are very few psychiatric cases among U.S. submarine crews. To be sure, submarine crews are carefully selected, but since the stress of this service is extreme, social organizational factors, namely, the intimate organization of submarine life, must be operative. A similar pattern held true for bomber crews in World War II, who developed tightly knit primary groups. In the Bomber Command of the RAF, for example, the casualty rate during World War II was reported at 64 percent, including those who were killed, wounded, missing, and injured. Nevertheless,

the psychiatric breakdown rate was only about 5 percent.

It would appear that group membership and identification in the military is an important factor in the individual's ability to handle stress, to cope with seemingly insurmountable problems, and to accomplish organizational objectives. A supervisor does not establish himself as a leader in the group only by the fact of his physical presence. An individual does not become a group member merely because of his proximity to others. The basic commitment to and recognition of the group requires a degree of time for both the supervisor and the supervised, and delays true group membership until psychological commitment and acceptance are given by both the supervisor and the supervised.

Status

Status refers to the rank an individual holds within the group and the value of that person as measured and legitimized by the group. Status is also achieved through organizational recognition to the degree that the primary group considers this recognition to be important. In this way promotion and awards in the military add status to the individual member until organizational recognition becomes so great that the individual is required to change primary groups, as in the instance of a senior noncommissioned officer gaining warrant status or a specialist being promoted to sergeant.

Evaluation of individual worth based on the judgment of one's peers or near peers is a major factor in status determination. This may be an informal evaluation (George is a good guy) or a formal evaluation (Army efficiency reports), where individuals frequently are evaluated by persons of the same primary group. This evaluation system may be one of the reasons for the inflation in efficiency report scores. There is a strong compulsion to report a member of one's primary group as exceptionally effective, for to submit a report of less than top quality may be viewed as a condemnation of the entire group. If members of the group are consistently rated high, the entire group achieves greater status. Similarly, a primary group member who displays more eccentricity than the group is willing to tolerate will be rated low, perhaps in spite of actual performance, in an attempt to publicly renounce the values of the eccentric member. This is normally a prelude to ejection of the individual from the primary group.

Kelly (1969) lists four factors which are the basis for status.

1. The ability of an individual to reward those with whom he interacts, but only if the reward itself is a scarce commodity. When rewards are automatic, they lose importance to the group and stop conferring status on the individual presenting the rewards.

2. The extent to which an individual is perceived as receiving a reward which other primary group members value. If a reward is difficult to obtain, both the giver and the recipient gain status from the presentation.

3. The cost that the individual incurs in terms of effort or risk in gaining a reward must be considerable. Unearned honors, awards, or rewards can end in embarrassment for the presenter, the recipient, and the organization because the award requires no cost in terms of effort or risk on the part of the recipient.

4. The individual's investments in the group and organization, to include seniority and tenure. The author once served in a battalion where the command sergeant major had over 30 years of service. His relationship with the noncommissioned officers in the battalion was like a beloved professor passing pearls of wisdom to a knowledge-hungry class. It was clear that the sergeant major's long service contributed to his considerable status in his primary group.

Status in the group is directly related to communication. Communication from primary group members is directed toward high-status members. If communications are not directed upward, individuals tend to communicate with persons of equal status. Whenever it is difficult to determine status, group members tend to avoid communication.

Status in communication is accentuated in the military environment because the organizational rank structure tends to determine primary groups. There are, however, major breaks in the primary groupings which tend to inhibit communications. Generally, shop floor workers are hesitant to initiate communication with management, just as private soldiers are reluctant to initiate communication with battalion commanders. These communication status observations are true in the military environment mainly within the primary group and are not necessarily true for communications between individuals of different groups.

Status is strongly correlated to individual self-concept. Society has status symbols ranging from the homes in which we live to the brand names of the products we use. A large part of our national economy is built around the ultimate status symbol, the automobile. Persons with a materialistic orientation undoubtedly feel better about themselves when they are riding in a luxury automobile. Organizational status symbols include the size of an office, the size of a desk and the material from which it is constructed (wood has infinitely more status than metal), the type of curtains in the window, and even the size of the secretary's office. Symbols of status appear ridiculous when academically examined, but they are of real importance in the establishment of a hierarchy in the primary group.

Morale

Morale can be described as the way in which an individual views himself and his environment. High morale is characterized by a positive attitude, determination and a "going to win" philosophy. Groups with high morale have certain characteristics which have been identified by Krech and Crutchfield (1948). These characteristics are:

1. The group is held together through internal cohesiveness rather than external pressures. Members feel a strong need to maintain the identity and integrity of the group. They believe that the group is an elite, that they are individually and collectively special.
2. The group has a minimum number of divisive factions. Group members are willing to settle problems among themselves without outside assistance.
3. The group members are adaptable to changes. There is a low amount of threat involved with change; creativity is encouraged. Personal and group growth is fostered through innovative thoughts and concepts.
4. There is a positive attraction and goodwill existing between members. People enjoy being with each other.
5. Goals and values are shared by members of the group within established limits. A certain amount of individual deviation from the group mean may be tolerated or may even be a source of pride among other primary group members; however, radical deviation in values or goals may lead to an individual's expulsion from the group.

6. The positive attitude of the members towards the objectives and styles of leadership structures the flow of interaction that is appropriate to task completion.

7. Members of the group desire to remain in it, not because they fear change, but because they genuinely enjoy being a part of the group.

There are many indications of low morale in groups. Krech and Crutchfield (1948) identified some of these as:

1. A tendency for a group to disintegrate under pressure. Military units formed hastily from individual stragglers have nearly always proven to be ineffective until they have undergone intensive training as a group. Hastily formed units lack the trust and confidence among individuals that is required for group cohesiveness.

2. Group internal strife arising from mutual mistrust and destructive criticism. The absence of trust among members seems to encourage projection of blame and guilt when plans go wrong. There is a tendency to lash out vindictively.

3. The inability to resolve problems within the group when anxiety is generated. Dissension among members precludes a consensus of opinion or a compromise position from being generated internally.

4. The absence of a friendly group atmosphere. This absence of a friendly atmosphere is not conducive to improvisation or creativity. Group members put in the required amount of time, do the required activities, and look no further than the task requires.

5. The lack of group goal consensus. Group members each have different individual goals which are unacceptable to the group as a whole. This characteristic is very similar to a group inability to resolve problems internally in that group agreement cannot be reached without outside assistance.

6. A negative attitude toward group purpose. There is a tendency for group members to reject the purpose for the group's existence combined with a desire to disestablish the group.

7. A lack of individual identification with the group. Group members do not have an ownership in the group, its purpose, goals, or the well-being of other members.

Groups provide the best vehicle for influencing individual attitudes and morale. The importance of the individual and his impact on the group is significant. The impact of the group and its importance to the individual is just as great. One complements the other; neither could meaningfully exist without the other.

Identification

Individual identification with a group seems to have a profound effect on the behavior of individuals when they are subjected to external dangers. Janis (1963) investigated some of the theoretical problems of this phenomenon. He asked:

1. Why does exposure to external danger have such a marked effect on the cohesiveness of a primary group?
2. What pre-conscious and unconscious mechanisms underlie the strengthening of group bonds under conditions of danger?
3. What are the favorable and unfavorable consequences of group identification?

Janis used surgical patients and wartime situations in his study, but most of the hypotheses appear to be applicable to any primary group which is subjected to a common source of external stress, although the psychological processes may be more subtle than the wartime or surgical dangers used in the study. Kelly (1969) gives an excellent summary of the argument:

In dangerous situations, the adult experiences a reactivation of separation anxiety--the child's fear of abandonment by his parents. At the same time, unconscious transference reactions take place, and a group leader becomes a parent surrogate. This fear-ridden type of dependency is likely to develop toward any authority figures who are perceived to be in a position to increase or decrease their chances of warding off the danger. The transference results in the tendency to overestimate the power of the surrogate person, which heightens sensitivity to his expressions of approval and disapproval. When a group is isolated, its members are likely to find unconscious substitutes for absent family members among group members; thus the commander or the surgeon is likely to become a symbolic

representative of the father, and a fellow soldier or fellow patient may become a substitute for a sibling.

External danger also stimulates needs for reassurance that are satisfied through interaction with fellow members of the primary group. Knowing that others are also frightened and unsure of their courage reduces anxieties about being a "sissy." Since mutual self-revelations are possible without one being censured or humiliated, emotional rapport is possible. Reality-testing, especially between experienced and inexperienced members, reduces frightening myths and rumours. The member is also reassured of his importance as a person and that the group can protect him from higher authorities. In so far as the soldier's needs for reassurance are satisfied by interpersonal relationships with his comrades, he becomes strongly dependent upon his work group to counteract his anxieties. He is thus anxious not to deviate from group norms, and to remain a member in good standing. Sharing one's fears may assist adjustment to stress, since it may facilitate the development of adaptive defenses and thereby reduce the chances of being traumatized if one is subsequently exposed to the actual harassment of severe danger. Some of the group's reactions to danger may have adverse effects. The loss of leaders or comrades may lead to mourning and introjection where the survivor unconsciously identifies with the casualty. This may lead to compulsive conformity with adverse effects on performance. In extreme cases, the person may become completely pre-symbolically present through introjection, resulting in the "Old Sergeant" syndrome. The syndrome consists of a progressive deterioration in attitudes and performance, including a gradual decrease in mental efficiency, loss of self-confidence in ability to cope with danger, withdrawal from current social activities, apathy, and intense guilt feelings.

Another unfavorable consequence is mutual support for delinquent behaviour where the group overrules the individual conscience. The delinquent behaviour is only contagious if members suddenly perceive the initiator fearlessly and guiltlessly enjoying what they have been longing to do. These delinquent acts may

later lead to remorse and guilt which can be alleviated by increased group cohesion.... Other psychological processes also enter the sharing of guilt: the group members openly deny the dysphoric effect and show toughminded indifference concerning immorality; surreptitious confession is also possible; the group's open discussion of the deed can reinforce an illusion that the deed had some ethical validity and also the illusion of being protected from punishment. The group also facilitates the development of rationalization in two ways: first by pooling the inventive resources of the members, and second by the fact that the group's unanimity adds authenticity to the excuse.

The Janis study provides a basis for the examination of group dynamics and how they affect individual behavior. During the early part of this decade the Army was constantly plagued by the deviant behavior described above. This delinquency was countered by opening communication channels, adopting a more humanistic approach to meeting individual needs, and by punishing offenders severely. While some progress has been made in reducing delinquent acts, there is still room for improvement, especially in communication and feedback combined with realistic needs assessment of individual group members.

The Leader in the Organizational Group

The leader is different from the rank and file worker in the organization in that, while the principles of individual identification, self-concept, and group membership still apply to him, the organizational influence on him is much greater. The leader must not only satisfy his own needs in terms of self-concept and primary group membership, but also must foster and promote organizational demands. The leader is concerned with both human and task effectiveness. The human effectiveness aspects include absenteeism, labor turnover, satisfaction, and morale. Task effectiveness aspects include productivity and innovation. The human effectiveness aspects are largely group-oriented, while task effectiveness is an aspect peculiar to the organization. The lower the leader is in the organizational hierarchy, the greater is his problem in dealing with the frequently antagonistic values of the work group and the organization. For this reason, the first-line supervisor may have the most difficult leadership job of all.

Argyris (1964) states that the worlds of the organization and the workers exist simultaneously and overlap. Difficulties generated from conflict between the two will not surface as long as individuals do not need to subscribe to both worlds simultaneously, as long as they can keep the nature of one hidden from the other, or as long as they openly acknowledge the dichotomy and defend themselves against it. While these alternatives are available to the individual workers, the first-line supervisor is prohibited from using them. The organization perceives him to be a member of both groups, serving both as a link between the workers and management and as the organization's representative in matters pertaining to its primary interests. The first-line supervisor is placed in a position where he represents both groups, is fully recognized by neither, and when the values of the groups are in opposition, he must side with the organization in order to insure the survival of his organizational career.

A leader has many functions in a group. He serves as an executive by creating or interpreting policy, defining objectives, determining the method of task accomplishment, and delegating responsibility and authority. The leader serves as a planner and as a technical expert for the group. He functions as the external group representative to superiors and others outside the group. Ingoing and outgoing information are channeled through him. The leader controls the internal relations of the group, resolving conflict and providing a model for appropriate behavior. He administers rewards and punishments and serves as an arbitrator and mediator both in the group and among several groups. The leader accepts responsibility for group action, thereby freeing individuals from the responsibility of over-involvement in decision-making and serves as the father-figure in terms of experience and authority within the group. He also serves as the scapegoat upon whom the group members can vent their anxieties, aggression, and guilt. Depending on his place in the organizational hierarchy, the leader will be more concerned with some functions than he is with others. It is important to note, however, that every function involves human interaction.

In the industrial setting, the first-line supervisor is the foreman, a man generally selected from the ranks of the workers after several years of work experience. He is mature and knows the organizational structure. In the military, the first-line supervisor is the junior noncommissioned officer or the lieutenant, depending on the type of unit. He is the least experienced of all the supervisors. The noncommissioned officer may attain his position during his first enlistment. The officer may be totally new to the organization.

Neither necessarily possesses the maturity nor the experience found in the industrial foreman, yet they are expected to accomplish the most difficult leadership tasks in the Army. In the infantry setting, the squad leader is responsible for 10 men in all areas of their existence, from feeding, clothing, and housing them through fostering personal and professional growth. The platoon leader, however, is directly responsible for supervising only four squad leaders, and he has a platoon sergeant to help him do that. The captain, with a first sergeant and a senior lieutenant, supervises the three platoon leaders; the battalion commander, with a formal staff, supervises five company commanders; and so on up the line. The scope of the first-line supervisor's responsibilities is greater both in terms of the number of personnel directly supervised and the extent of the supervision than that of the leaders at higher levels.

Human interaction between the individual and the organization is largely controlled by the first-line supervisor. The actions of the supervisor impact on the individual's attitude toward himself, his job, his co-workers, and the organization. When interpersonal problems arise, the first-line supervisor is the leader who must recognize the symptom, identify the problem, and implement a solution. Human relations problems do not begin at the top level in an organization; they begin at the bottom. The actions and attitudes of the supervisory hierarchy are important in creating, maintaining or eliminating an atmosphere conducive to dissension; but the initial contact between the organization and the problem is made by the first-line supervisor. This leader is on the spot, and his initial actions may determine whether the problem is solved immediately and satisfactorily or is left unsolved to expand to a critical proportion.

The first-line supervisor is subject to emotional conflict resulting from membership in two conflicting groups. Renck (1955) states that the source of the conflict stems from the foreman's recognition "...that he doesn't have all the facts, that he is not in a position to make clear-cut judgments on the actions of his superiors. But he is in a position--a better position than anyone else--to judge the impact of these actions on himself and his work group." If the leader identifies more closely with his men than with the organization, he can become frustrated in an attempt to implement change.

Because the first-line supervisor is in the best position to judge the impact of any organizational action, it is imperative that the leader establishes and maintains a viable feedback mechanism to the organization. It is equally important that this feedback is

accurate, unbiased and honest. Low self-concept individuals tend to avoid "making waves." The low self-concept leader, in an attempt to mask his self-concept through the acquisition of power, may distort the feedback to fit his perception of his superior's prejudices, values and dislikes; to conform the feedback to what he perceives his superior wishes to hear. This problem of feedback distortion based on low self-concept tends to snowball. Argyris (1964) illustrates this point. "If an executive learns to value the superior's feelings, needs, and prejudices, and to suppress his own, his own sense of self-esteem will tend to decrease. This, in turn, will tend to reinforce his dependence on the superior." The leader at whatever echelon who provides inaccurate feedback to the organization because of self-serving considerations does himself and his organization a disservice. The disservice to himself is the fact that he becomes increasingly more distant from achieving self-esteem; the disservice to the organization is that the consequences of organizational actions will not be known until it is too late to modify them.

The leader unquestionably is in a difficult position between the organizational demands and group needs. Kelly (1969) states that the most important mark of authentic leadership is the suppression of the impulse to dominate others, yet expressions such as "people matter," "treat subordinates like people," "teamwork counts," "a happy ship is an efficient ship," and "treat others as you would be treated" are naive and unsophisticated. He says that the success of a large organization rests on the proper combination of effectiveness and human satisfaction. This supports the task approach management theory. In the military environment, this task approach is job efficiency and human relations mixed in proper proportions to produce goal attainment and the satisfaction of human needs. The leader is the instrument through which both goals are attained.

Unlike a civilian group member, the military leader does not rise to a position of leadership in the group based on group consensus. He is appointed by the organization and imposed upon the group. There is no group selection process, and dissatisfied group members will probably not be free to leave the group. In a nonmilitary group, the leader has demonstrated those skills in human relations and expertise appropriate to the group in order to achieve his position. The military leader, however, must demonstrate those same skills after joining the group in order to legitimize his position through group acceptance. In effect, he must "earn his way" into true group membership.

Gaining group membership does not require that the leader needs to pay court to the group at the expense of discipline. In fact, the easy-going approach may well serve to delay or prevent group member acceptance. Individual members realize that the leader is given his position through organizational rules and authority. They realize that, whether they approve or not, the leader will be with them for some time. Insofar as leader rewards and punishments are important to group members, they will be anxious to accept the leader and to be accepted by him. The leader who displays integrity, high ethical values, fairness, openness, empathetic understanding, and the willingness to risk through the sharing of experiences, values, and emotions will have little trouble gaining acceptance by the group. No individual will want the leader to be easily manipulated. They will expect that the leader be approachable and communicative.

Kelly (1969) lists four human relations traits which are necessary for the leader in a group:

1. An insight into the leader's own personality dynamics, motivations, and defense postures. The leader should be aware of his self-concept and those factors from which it was derived. He must also be aware of those emotional areas in which he is vulnerable. He must understand his value system and motivations and be open in his acknowledgement of them.
2. An awareness and understanding of the difference between his own outlook, values, and perceptions and those of others, while maintaining the integrity of his own point of view. Although he should be receptive to the ideas and values of others, he should not necessarily change his values to conform to those of others.
3. An understanding of the nature of group processes in the organization. He should understand the peer pressure which requires that first-term soldiers refer to careerists as "lifers" without taking personal affront. If he understands the impact of group dynamics on behavior, he can predict the actions and reactions of group members.
4. An awareness and sensitivity to the nature of the social structure or social system which stratifies his society. He must be aware of the social structure of the organization and his realistic place in that structure. Instead of visualizing himself as a cog in a machine or a number in a computer, he should be aware of his importance to the organization.

These traits suggest that, to be successful in group leadership, the leader must be aware of himself and his motivations, the motivations and needs of others, and the structured environment in which the group performs its work functions. This awareness or sensitivity is reflected in a clear pattern of leader traits. Smith (1966) has found in comparing several different studies that sensitive leaders are more intelligent, more tolerant, and more independent but responsible and considerate in relating to others. Other but less consistent results show sensitive persons to be more imaginative and less gregarious. It appears that the sensitive persons are those who have learned the most, academically and practically, about human interactions. In Figure 3-7, Smith shows the process of learning about people.




Figure 3-7. Learning process.

The most sensitive persons are those who are most highly motivated, most open to new experiences, most willing to learn, and most able to assess what they have learned.

Smith has listed the following causes for insensitivity:

1. Absolutism. Everything is perceived by the leader as black or white, right or wrong.
2. Simple thinking. People or things are good or bad, moral or immoral.
3. Fear of psychological learning. The leader fears he will be less effective as a result of psychological learning.
4. The choosing of the course of least effort. As soon as a leader feels he knows enough about a subordinate to allow him to do the job, he stops learning about the subordinate.

5. Faulty stereotypes. This is especially prevalent in the racial or ethnic bigotry which has not been completely eliminated from the armed forces. The faulty stereotype of the "chewing-out" counseling technique being appropriate to all military counseling has been discussed earlier in this chapter. Another example is the belief of many people that long hair indicates an inferior soldier.

6. Oversimplification. This is drawing conclusions from inadequate evidence, such as the classification of a subordinate as unreliable because he was late for a formation.

In summary, Smith's causes for insensitivity seem to revolve around a rigidity of thought, an unwillingness to consider other points of view, and an unwillingness to learn about the inner thoughts, motivations, and values of others. It would appear that the development of sensitivity is dependent upon a strong desire of the individual for this development. Without this strong motivation, sensitivity development or training will probably be unsuccessful.

Leader training

Fiedler and his associates have done considerable research on leadership. Fiedler's research indicates that leaders can be classified into two categories: those who are task-motivated and those who are relationship-motivated.

Fiedler (1960) provided following characteristics of the task-motivated leader:

1. He tends to be formal in his relationship to peers and subordinates.
2. He is reserved and withdrawn in his relationship within the organization.
3. He prefers formal consultation rather than informal opinions.
4. He judges subordinates solely on the basis of performance.
5. Although reserved, he maintains smooth interpersonal relationships.
6. He does not develop deep friendships with co-workers.

7. He demands and receives freedom of action from his superiors.
8. He expects subordinates to make mistakes and plans for them.
9. He prefers ambitious subordinates.

The relationship-motivated leader is described by Fiedler as being relatively inefficient compared with the task-motivated leader because psychologically closer relations make it more difficult for the leader to criticize subordinates. To be effective, the relationship-motivated leader must be informally accepted by the group. Characteristics of the relationship-motivated leader are:

1. He does not seek formal role relationships.
2. He is concerned with good human relationships, often at the expense of efficiency.
3. He prefers informal discussions rather than staff meetings.
4. He selects friends from among co-workers.
5. He may dominate and possess subordinates.
6. He delegates only minor matters and likes frequent individual consultation.

Both leaders are effective, but under different conditions. The task-motivated leader performs best when he has a great deal of control and influence over his environment or when he has almost no control or influence over the situation. The relationship-motivated leader functions best in situations which are moderately favorable. Fiedler's concept is to engineer the job to fit the leader. For example, a task-motivated leader who appears to be lessening in effectiveness could be brought back to greater productivity by decreasing his control over the situation. This could be done by decreasing the structure of the task he must perform. The relationship-motivated leader can be kept more effective by subjecting him to situations of moderate favorability. Situational favorableness can be moderated by changing the structure under which the task will be accomplished. Figure 3-8 illustrates Fiedler's concept of leader effectiveness.




Figure 3-8. Leader Effectiveness

The attitude of the leader toward his subordinates determines his psychological distance from the group he leads. Carlson (1951) has stated that psychological distance is manipulated by increasing or reducing subordinate stress. Stress can be increased by applying a series of random challenges which require responses. This tends to formalize the superior-subordinate relationship and increases the psychological distance between them. Similarly, calling a subordinate by his first name, inviting him to share a coffee break, or praising his job performance reduces stress levels and decreases the psychological distance.

Psychological distance and geographical distance are strongly correlated. If a leader is too accessible to his subordinates, he does not orchestrate the entire task but rather tends to over-control and over-supervise, often with severe, long-term, negative organizational results. Subordinate leaders then fail to develop properly and to learn through experience. The leader's behavior model is repeated at all echelons of the organization, causing over-supervision to occur throughout the entire structure. Carlson (1951) has also found that supervision is closer in low-production than in high-production groups.

A leader's understanding of psychological distance and its effect on subordinate behavior and unit productivity can be a useful tool in maintaining organizational efficiency. Fiedler (1960) cites one example in which an air force base commander systematically varied his psychological distance from his primary subordinates. When the leader perceived that the subordinate leaders were secure and not overly

concerned with the efficiency of their units, the base commander became more reserved and role-oriented. The subordinate commanders wondered what had gone wrong. Their stress level was increased and they channeled their anxieties into introspection of their organizations and increased attention to their work. The result was a noticeable increase in base efficiency. Figure 3-9 shows the effects of anxiety on behavior (Coleman, 1960).

<u>Slight Anxiety</u>	<u>Moderate Anxiety</u>	<u>Severe Anxiety</u>
1. Alerting	1. Less spontaneity	1. Organizational behavior breaks down
2. Increased awareness to outside events	2. Rigidity, habitual responses	2. Inability to distinguish between important and unimportant stimuli
3. Psychological preparation	3. Reduced improvisation	3. Stereotyped, random-appearing patterns
4. Effective behavior integration	4. Maintenance of adequate behavior	4. Irritability, distractability
5. Increased productive behavior	5. requires effort	5. Impaired learning, thinking
	5. Narrowing & distortion of perceptions	

Figure 3-9. Effects of Anxiety.

This figure shows that slight anxiety is beneficial to organizational productivity, and increased anxiety may produce undesirable behavior. A leader must be sensitive to the anxiety (stress) level of individuals in his organization and weigh his actions in terms of anxiety produced against the positive and negative behaviors generated by that anxiety.

Fiedler, Mahar, and Chermers (1977) produced Leader Match IV, a training tool designed to provide leaders with an awareness of their leadership styles. It helps the leader understand how best to employ

subordinate leaders, based on task or relationship motivation and situational favorableness. Because it is difficult to modify an individual's personality and motivational structure, sensitivity training has generally proven to be ineffective when conducted outside the organization. Leader Match advocates modifying the job to fit the leader. It appears to have a significant influence on leader performance. In a study of naval officers and petty officers, it was found that performance increased significantly in the group which had participated in the Leader Match exercise compared to a control group which had not participated (Leister, Borden and Fiedler, 1977).

An even more important validation of the Leader Match concept was a study by Fiedler and Mahar (1978), in which groups of ROTC students from 18 universities were compared. Half of the schools received Leader Match, half received no material. At ROTC summer camp, the students were randomly assigned to platoons. Students were rated both by Regular Army officers and by peers. The results showed significantly higher ratings in all areas for students from the schools in which Leader Match was administered.

These studies show that leaders who are aware of their own motivations; of the motivations of others; and of how individual performance, behavior, and organizational success are correlated to human interaction perform better than do those leaders who have not as great an awareness. This awareness is the essence of human relations.

Power

A great danger in modifying leader behaviors to produce desired behaviors from subordinates is the tendency to carry power beyond those bounds which produce desirable organizational results. The military pyramidal structure is based on the control of subordinates through power derived from several sources. French and Raven (1968) have defined five types of power:

1. Reward power. The belief in the probability of a reward being granted for compliance to a wish or order of a superior.
2. Coercive power. The belief that noncompliance with a superior's orders will result in the punishment of withholding of rewards.
3. Expert power. Power generated when expertise in a given field is a scarce commodity. The holder of the expertise can make

demands on the organization through the threat of withholding his expertise.

4. Referent power. Power of the popular or admired leader with whom less powerful or subordinate persons can identify. Revolutionary and charismatic leaders frequently possess this power.

5. Legitimate power. Power which comes through the structure of the organization, where the holder of the power can impose his will on others based on organizational authority and the perception of others that this authority is lawful.

Cartwright (1966) maintains that a deficiency in social psychology is a softness in power. The important social problems which demand attention raise questions of power which our systematic knowledge cannot answer. It is important to recognize that a social-psychological theory is not complete and cannot be advanced, especially in the military subsociety, until the concept of power is addressed.

The leader in the military establishment has power in the five categories identified by French and Raven. The degree of power derived from each category varies with the leader. The greater the power is based in referent and legitimate types, the more willing is the worker response. One of the greatest challenges to the leader today is to exercise leadership without abusing this power. In meeting this challenge, human relations makes one of its most important contributions.

Power or influence can be exerted either in a face-to-face interaction, or it may be indirectly applied. In Figure 3-10, Kotter (1977) gives an analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the basis of power for both methods of influence.

Face-to-face methods	What they can influence	Advantages	Drawbacks
Exercise obligation-based power. (Legitimate)	Behavior within zone that the other perceives as legitimate in light of the obligation.	Quick. Requires no outlay of tangible resources.	If the request is outside the acceptable zone, it will fail. If it is too far outside, others might see it as illegitimate.
Exercise power based on perceived expertise. (Expert)	Attitudes and behavior within the zone of perceived expertise.	Quick. Requires no outlay of tangible resources.	If the request is outside the acceptable zone, it will fail. If it is too far outside, others might see it as illegitimate.
Exercise power based on identification with a manager. (Referent)	Attitudes and behavior that are not in conflict with the ideals that underlie the identification.	Quick. Requires no expenditure of limited resources.	Restricted to influence attempts that are not in conflict with the ideals that underlie the identification.
Exercise power based on perceived dependence. (Reward)	Wide range of behavior that can be monitored.	Quick. Can often succeed when other methods fail.	Repeated influence attempts encourage the other to gain power over the influencer.
Coercively exercise power based on perceived dependence. (Coercive)	Wide range of behavior that can be easily monitored.	Quick. Can often succeed when other methods fail.	Invites retaliation. Very risky.
Use persuasion.	Very wide range of attitudes and behavior.	Can produce internalized motivation that does not require monitoring. Requires no power or outlay of scarce material resources.	Can be very time-consuming. Requires other person to listen.
Combine these methods.	Depends on the exact combination.	Can be more potent and less risky than using a single method.	More costly than using a single method.
Indirect methods	What they can influence	Advantages	Drawbacks
Manipulate the other's environment by using any or all of the face-to-face methods.	Wide range of behavior and attitudes.	Can succeed when face-to-face methods fail.	Can be time-consuming. Is complex to implement. If very risky, especially if used frequently.
Change the forces that continuously act on the individual. Formal Organizational arrangements Informal social arrangements. Technology. Resources available. Statement of organizational goals.	Wide range of behavior and attitudes on a continuous basis.	Has continuous influence, not just a one-shot effect. Can have a very powerful impact.	Often requires a considerable power outlay to achieve.

Figure 3-10. Methods of Influence

Generally, face-to-face methods of using power are more immediate in application and produce rapid results. If the power does exist and the leader correctly understands its nature and strength, he can influence the behavior of others by little more than a request or command. Power based on expertise or identification is likely to have a more immediate and longer-lasting effect than power derived from other bases.

Effective leaders may also rely on two less direct methods of exerting power to reduce obstacles or problems which would be otherwise unassailable through direct, face-to-face methods. A leader may employ any or all of the direct power methods to influence an individual who, in turn, influences yet another person. This manipulation, however, has a high risk in that the manipulator may acquire a negative reputation.

The leader who adopts the principles of manipulation to accomplish his goals runs the real risk of being labeled a con man or an operator by his peers and subordinates, often at the expense of their perception of his ethics and integrity. Christie (1969) has given four characteristics of the manipulator. First, the manipulator is not concerned with morality in the conventional sense. People are things, numbers, means by which tasks are accomplished. A loss rate among subordinates is acceptable so long as it does not endanger the ability of the leader to accomplish his goal. Military leaders who exhibit this characteristic in combat are viewed as "can do" men by superiors and as butchers by subordinates. The second characteristic is a coolness in interpersonal relations. Emotional involvement makes it more difficult to view another person as a manipulatable object. The manipulator will desire to maintain considerable psychological distance. The third characteristic is the absence of significant ideological persuasion in the manipulator. The leader may become more concerned with the actual manipulation than he is with organizational goal achievement. The leader's goal may actually become the act of manipulation rather than the organizational objective. This is the leader who becomes a compulsive con man and operator. The last manipulator characteristic is over-rationalization in dealing with others. His every action has been rationalized to conform to his persuasive technique. A manipulator is unconcerned with morality, aloof, and excessively involved with the systematic exploitation of human weakness, which results in the projection of a super-rational image.

There is a general consensus among counselors, psychologists and society in general that manipulation is undesirable. Shostrom (1967) states that everyone is a manipulator in one way or another. It is therefore important that leaders recognize the characteristics of manipulation and examine their actions for signs of its excessive use. There is little doubt that protracted manipulation is detrimental to human relations, interpersonal communications, and organizational goal accomplishment. Kotter (1977) has enumerated some of the disadvantages of manipulative behavior. Manipulators tend to undermine their own positions of authority. Practically no one is willing to identify with a manipulator. Similarly, individuals are reluctant to accept at face value a manipulator's honest attempts at persuasion. They become suspicious in all their dealings with confirmed manipulators. In extreme cases, this suspicion of a manipulative leader can ruin that leader's career. It appears true that once labeled a manipulator, a leader will always be perceived to be a manipulator.

A second method of indirect use of power is for the leader to make permanent changes in the work environment. Job descriptions can be changed, work measurement criteria can be modified, and the rewards system can be altered. An example of this use of power is a commander who waives a promotion criteria so that an otherwise exceptionally well-qualified soldier can be promoted. The leader is manipulating the environment to produce desired behavior from subordinates or from the organization. This form of manipulation may produce the desired effect on the individual or group over a sustained period.

Communication

A requirement for any human interaction is communication. This communication can be verbal, emotional, or physical, but it is necessary for the exchange of ideas and thoughts. The leader must be especially aware of the importance and direction of communications. The leader must be both a transmitter and a receiver of communications to be fully operational. The leader must communicate with peers, superiors and subordinates. He must maintain an atmosphere which is conducive to communication, especially to feedback.

To communicate, the leader must ascertain several things. First, he must know the purpose of the communication process, what he hopes to accomplish, the requirement for innovation and creativity, and the complexity of the task. He must determine whether the communication process is designed to produce an attitude change or to reinforce present attitudes. He must understand the shape of the communications network, whether the message is to be sent vertically to superiors and

subordinates, horizontally to peers, or to both. Finally, he must also understand the setting in which the communications will take place. The process of communicating in the military organizational environment is different from the process of communicating with one's spouse. Ogilby (1966) gave an excellent example of leader verbal communication of managerial policy which has strong human relations overtones in this quotation:

So once a year I assemble the whole brigade...and give them a candid report on our operations, profits and all. Then I tell them what kind of behavior I admire, in these terms:

1. I admire people who work hard, who bite the bullet. I dislike passengers who don't pull their weight in the boat. It is more fun to be overworked than to be underworked....

2. I admire people with first-class brains, because you cannot run a great advertising agency without brainy people. But brains are not enough unless they are combined with intellectual honesty.

3. I have an inviolable rule against employing nepots and spouses, because they breed politics. Whenever two of our people get married, one of them must depart....

4. I admire people who work with gusto. If you don't enjoy what you are doing, I beg you find another job....

5. I despise toadies who suck up to their bosses; they are generally the same people who bully their subordinates.

6. I admire self-confident professionals, the craftsmen who do their jobs with superlative excellence. They always seem to respect the expertise of their colleagues. They don't poach.

7. I admire people who hire subordinates who are good enough to succeed them. I pity people who are so insecure that they feel compelled to hire inferiors as their subordinates.

8. I admire people who build up their subordinates because this is the only way we can promote from within the ranks. I detest having to go outside to fill important jobs, and I look forward to the day when that will never be necessary.

9. I admire people with gentle manners who treat other people as human beings. I abhor quarrelsome people. I abhor people who wage paper-warfare. The best way to keep the peace is to be candid.

10. I admire well-organized people who deliver their work on time. The Duke of Wellington never went home until he had finished all the work on his desk.

Feedback is a major portion of the communication process. Feedback comes from peers and subordinates as well as from superiors, sometimes in the forms of efficiency reports, counseling and other essentially verbal means, and at other times in non-verbal expression. However it is transmitted, from whatever source, feedback is a means through which a leader can evaluate the effect of his actions.

Ethics and the Leader

In discussing the leader in the organizational or work group, we should consider the importance of integrity and ethics to effective leader functioning in both the organizational and group settings. Monographs 8 and 9 have both stressed the importance of modeling in the leadership process. It is imperative that all leaders from the squad through Army levels act in such a way that their integrity is above reproach.

There are a number of pointed examples which illustrate the importance of ethical conduct and integrity to the leadership process. In any human interaction, trust in and respect for individuals are essential elements for a positive relationship. Persons who are held in contempt do not relate well with others. Status and self-concepts are affected. In recent years, the subject of ethics has come to be defined in extemporaneous, situational, and absolute terms.

Situational ethics exist between the two extremes of absolute ethics (based on concepts of right and wrong often steeped in religious dogma and cultural tradition) and extemporaneous ethics (any action is acceptable if you think it appropriate).




Figure 3-11. The Ethical Spectrum.

Between the poles of absolute and extemporaneous ethics is the area of situational ethics with which most day-to-day business in the military is conducted. In situational ethics, the degree of situationalism becomes important for the survival of the leader in the organizational setting. Figure 3-11 serves to illustrate the ethical dilemma. The belt labeled A represents the degree of organizational tolerance for ethical deviation from the absolute job ethics. It is within this band that exhibited behaviors are seen by the organization as being ethical. Individual 1 will be ejected from the organization for unethical behavior unless he changes his ethical code so that his behavior will fall between the limits tolerated by the organization. Similarly, individual 2 will find that his behavior will cause him to reject the organization because he will view the organization as being unethical. For both individuals, their ethical behavior must regress toward the organizational mean if the desire to continue in the organization. Organizational ethical norms may be moved closer to either pole, but this is a long-term process, probably longer in duration than the tenure of any individual in the organization whose behavior falls outside the belt of organizational acceptability.

An ethical problem arises when the same ethics are not used at all organizational levels. It has been hypothesized that subordinates will display those ethics which the superior will allow them to display and still survive in the organizational setting. The general, for instance, says that theft is wrong. If the soldier sees that one supply sergeant who "scrounges" is rewarded with promotion while the other supply sergeant who does not scrounge is passed over for promotion, the soldier may abandon the absolute ethic of not stealing and adapt a situational ethic which permits "moonlight requisitioning." In December 1977 there appeared in the Army Times an article which reported the relief of a district recruiting commander for unethical conduct. This man replaced a commander under whose direction the unit had consistently failed to meet recruiting objectives. The new commander used a method to "beat the system" and meet objectives. The Army got the personnel it required, the commander kept his job and received awards for his performance. Everything went well until his method was exposed. The real question was: if there was, in fact, unethical conduct, where was it first exhibited? Was it first exhibited by the commander in his attainment of the objective by any means? The Army got the required personnel and the commander kept his job as long as his method was secret. Or was the first unethical conduct displayed by an upper management level which, in effect, required that the commander meet recruiting objectives or have his career terminated through relief from command? The ethic espoused by management was close to the absolute pole while the organizational actions demanded situational ethics closer to the extemporaneous pole. Other questions concerning ethics could be addressed to this situation, but illustration of the problems generated by the ethical dichotomy have been amply illustrated. Had absolute ethics been espoused and modeled by leaders at all levels and if organizational demands had permitted absolute ethics, there would have been no problem or relief. Similarly, had the same degree of situational ethics been in force at all levels, there would have been no problem. It is not important to the purpose of this monograph to place a value judgment on the desirability of situational versus absolute ethics. What is important is to point out the problems which arise when the same degree of ethics is not practiced by all levels in the organization.

Integrity, a concept of personal honesty, is a very important part of a leader's credibility. It requires that the individual act in strict accord with a self-stated code of moral conduct candidly, openly, and honestly. It is very important to the organization, to the leader, and to the individual that what is stated by the leader be factual. Ward (1961) and several others found in independent studies

that in the businesses surveyed, executives said they wanted aggressive, energetic subordinates but, when tested, they were found to reward and actually prefer subordinates who were retiring, meek and who avoided trouble and arguments. This contradiction between what is professed as desirable and what is rewarded as desirable becomes apparent in the organization and reduces the effectiveness of managers. Leaders in the military must be attuned to the fact that they must be credible if they are to facilitate human interaction. Announced criteria for promotion, for example, must be the actual criteria used. During an analysis of the promotion scheme of an 8,000-worker factory in California, Dalton (1959) made an interesting discovery concerning the impact of managerial integrity on the ability of an organization to achieve its goals. The company's official policy indicated that honesty, ability, cooperation, and hard work were the primary criteria for promotion, with age, length of service, formal education, and relevant training as important peripheral factors influencing promotion. Dalton found that in practice the key factors in managerial promotions really were German or Anglo-Saxon ancestry and membership in the Masons, yacht club, and the Republican Party. The absence of credibility in the organizational promotion scheme spread to all levels of organizational interaction. The ability of the organization to achieve its objectives was severely threatened because the integrity of the leadership was in question. Similarly, the leader who publishes a formal promotion policy and later deviates from it destroys more than the credibility of a promotion policy. He endangers his personal credibility and effectiveness in the group leadership role.

Summary

In this chapter we have explored the leader as a part of both the organizational structure and the work group, recognizing that the leader, especially the first-line supervisor, has the difficult task of providing the bridge between individual and group needs and organizational demand. Communications, behavior, attitudes and responsibilities have all been addressed in terms of human interaction. In the next chapter we will look at those specific skills in human relations identified in Monograph 8 and expanded upon in Monograph 9 in an attempt to further amplify the need for the skill requirement.

CHAPTER FOUR

HUMAN RELATIONS SKILLS

This chapter examines those human relations skills which are important to leader success. Clement and Ayres (1976) have identified skills by organizational levels. These levels are first-line (NCO/LT), low (CPT), middle (MAJ/LTC), top (COL) and executive (general officer). The premise is that different skills are required at different levels. In actuality, different skills are used with differing frequency at various levels. In this chapter the skills required for individual human relations competence will be examined by those levels of supervision identified in monographs 8 and 9.

For leaders in the armed forces, human relations skills can generally be divided into those appropriate for relations within the primary work group and those for relations among several groups. A noncommissioned officer or a platoon leader is concerned with his primary work group, the platoon. His relationships are primarily focused in that group. He will be interested mainly in intra-group relations skills. The general officer, however, must deal with several different groups. A post commander, for instance, must deal with the military organization, the civilian community, and dependent families. He must therefore be more concerned with those human relations skills applicable to intergroup relations.

First-line supervisor

In the organizational environment, the first-line supervisor is mainly concerned with the development of those skills which will enhance his ability to work productively with members of his primary work group. The leader needs to establish himself as a member of the work group. This requires the leader to form relationships with other group members. The bases for these relations may be any or all of the elements of power identified by French and Raven (Chapter 3). If the bases for the power of the group leader are primarily coercive, reward, and legitimate, the relationships will tend to be authoritarian, psychologically distant, and formal. The relationship of the leader to the group will be organizationally imposed and maintained. These bases of power will probably be more comfortable for task-motivated leaders than for relationship-motivated leaders. If the bases for power are primarily expert or referent, the leader will establish himself in the group based on his personality and technical ability. Relationship-motivated leaders will probably be most comfortable with

these bases of power. Intragroup relationships will tend to be psychologically close, informal, and democratic in the sense that subordinates are encouraged to provide input for decisions.

Once the leader has established himself in the group, he must exhibit leadership maintenance skills. These skills overlap from the human relations dimensions into other leadership dimensions. Communication is one such skill. To maintain human relations in the work group, the leader must keep his subordinates informed, not only of daily missions, but also of long-term activity forecasts. This allows subordinates to plan their own activities to conform to organizational demands. A product of this individual planning is a positive attitude toward the organization. This positive attitude is conducive to human interaction.

A leader who desires to maintain a healthy human relations atmosphere must give careful consideration to reward power. Rewards must be equitable if they are to be valued by the group. Inequitable reward systems generate hostility in non-recipients toward the grantor of the reward and subsequently degrade the ability of groups to function efficiently. A promotion based on friendship, an afternoon off to play golf with the boss, and a verbal commendation to one group member at the expense of other members are all counterproductive to human relations and organizational objectives.

Closely correlated with reward power is the giving of credit when and where it is due. The leader who takes personal credit for group achievement will find that his ability to communicate with subordinates has decreased. This decrease is the result of increased psychological distance and formality in interactions between group members and the leader precipitated by the failure of the leader to give proper credit for the group achievement. Conversely, the leader who accepts credit on behalf of the group reflects the credit upon everyone in the group. Subsequently he will find that the group's ability to accomplish organizational goals has been increased. Whether this is ethical behavior, common sense, or personal integrity, it most certainly exemplifies good human relations.

As discussed in Chapter 3, all individuals have needs. Failure to meet these needs generates problems. By the time needs are expressed, problems have often developed to the extent that some impairment in group functional ability has taken place. To be effective in human relations, the first-line leader must anticipate the individual's needs, evaluate the magnitude or complexity of the needs, and

then respond to the needs if he is to reduce or eliminate problems within the group. Take for instance, a platoon leader who is notified on the 25th of a month that his unit will be sent on two months of temporary duty starting on the 29th. If the platoon leader anticipates that separation of group members from their families just prior to payday will create hardships, he can take steps to insure that those hardships will not occur. The platoon members will probably work harder for the leader because they see that he is looking after their interests. The leader will probably not have to grant time off at a later date for group members to rectify financial chaos.

In responding to subordinate's needs, the leader should be aware of the relationship between the needs and the motivations of the individual. The greater the correlation between the need and motivation, the greater is the requirement to meet the need. The leader must clearly identify both the needs of the individuals and the needs of the organization. To produce higher individual motivation, the leader should, whenever possible, insure that individual and organizational needs coincide. This is most conducive to the application of the task approach management method.

The leader needs to continually assess subordinate behavior if he is to accurately identify the needs of the members of his primary group. Communicative skills are required for this assessment. The leader should be able to discuss problems, needs and concerns of the subordinates. In addition to a knowledge of the individual's needs and motivations, the leader needs to have confidence in himself and in his judgment so that discussions of this type do not greatly threaten him. If the leader is not able to engage in interpersonal dialog and cannot comfortably handle accurate feedback, interpersonal communications will wither and die. The leader will lose the channel through which he explains organizational requirements to subordinates. This inability to communicate organizational demands ultimately results in the lessening or elimination of group capability to achieve organizational goals.

The identification of the leader's own attitudes and beliefs about others is an important dimension of intragroup relations. To achieve this level of introspection, the first-line supervisor needs some basic understanding of human psychology. He needs to understand clearly just how attitudes and beliefs are formed and how these attitudes and beliefs impact on perceptions. The leader should recognize, just as Plato did centuries ago, that truth for the leader is only his perception of an action or event. Every member of the group has his

own perception; therefore, each member has a slightly different perception which he looks upon as truth. A major impediment to accurate perception is stereotype formation.

Stereotyping is the result of many processes, most of which are connected with a learning process. We learn through experience with persons or things with specific characteristics. These characteristics are then applied across the board to all members of the same group. Stereotyping may be positive or negative; nevertheless, they all distort the accuracy of perceptions. General George S. Patton, Jr. stereotyped black soldiers as slow-thinking and reported that because of this they had no place in armor units. This stereotype clearly influenced the general's perception of ability. Conversely, we try to encourage a stereotype among potential enemies that our Army is indestructible, in order to gain for ourselves a psychological advantage in the event of war. A leader should be aware of the stereotype process if he is to reduce the inaccuracy in his perceptions.

To facilitate human relations, the first-line supervisor should identify the reference groups to which he belongs. The group platoon leader may consider himself to be a member-leader of a platoon, a member of the officer corps, and a member of a family group. To be an effective leader in each of these groups, he must clearly understand the attitudes and beliefs of each group and compare them with his own. Only with a thorough understanding of the similarities and differences between group and personal attitudes can the leader accurately predict behavior resultant from his actions.

One of the human relations tasks facing the first-line supervisor is the education and training of subordinates. In accomplishing this task, the leader should examine the relationship between the needs of the individual and of the organization. If training could improve expertise and further motivate the individual, then the training could also improve organizational effectiveness. The leader must then determine the availability of training and adjust schedules to allow the individual to participate.

The educational development process for subordinates in the primary group requires that the leader assess the needs of the individual and the organization, collect information about the training available, inform subordinates of the training programs in operations, and provide the opportunity for subordinates to take advantage of the training. Additionally, the leader should also attempt to help the subordinate in funding the training when appropriate, and provide an

encouraging atmosphere for continued education. Education program effectiveness can be measured through feedback, both in terms of job performance and in individual satisfaction.

Indoctrination of new group members is an important facet of intragroup relations for the first-line supervisor. Since the primary group in the military is created and maintained by the organization, individuals do not gravitate to the group because of common interests and goals. It is a function of the first-line supervisor to develop a commonality of interests and goals within his group. By understanding the relationship between knowledge of job requirements and job performance, the leader can initiate an orientation program. Identification of the information required for new members, the amount of information already possessed by the new member, and the shortfall between the two must be considered in the selection of the methods to be used to impart required information to the new member.




Figure 4-1. Information Requirements.

At this point in the exploration of intragroup human relations requirements, a definite pattern emerges. In each of the skills discussions above, basic human relations patterns can be used to insure group needs are met. Figure 4-2 summarizes the process through which the leader exercises a human relations approach to task accomplishment by integration of organizational and subordinates' needs.




Figure 4-2. Human Relations Decision Progression.

The elimination of any of the steps in the progression of events leading to leader actions lessens the human relations dynamic in the group. The leader is less able to function in a group if he does not understand himself, his needs and his motivations. Similarly, if he cannot identify subordinate needs, he is blind in his quest to meet those needs and to motivate group members. He must also fully understand the organizational arena in which the primary group functions as well as that which the organization demands to be accomplished. The communications aspects of the process are obvious. Any amount of understanding is meaningless unless it can be communicated. Of course, communication is a two-way street. It is vital for the leader to assess both individual needs and organizational demands.

Perhaps the single factor which separates human relations skills from other skills is the element of empathy. Empathy is the ability to share others' emotions and feelings, or the projection of oneself into the position of another to better understand the other person. Empathy can perhaps be better illustrated through an example. A platoon leader has Specialist Brown in his group. Specialist Brown has been tasked to leave on a three-day field exercise tomorrow morning. This is a clearly defined organizational demand which relates to mission accomplishment. The matter is complicated by the fact that Specialist Brown is supposed to take his wife to a medical appointment. The appointment was made three months ago, and if Mrs. Brown misses it, it will take a similar length of time for rescheduling. There is a requirement for Specialist Brown to be present during the medical appointment. The Browns live in a remote area off-post, and Mrs. Brown does not drive. Specialist Brown is clearly needed for reasons other than field training. Looking at the situation objectively, there appears to be a conflict between unit mission and troop welfare. Military has traditionally demanded that in time of conflict between leadership principles, the mission takes precedence; therefore, Brown should reschedule the appointment.

When empathy is induced into the situation, however, the rules change. An empathetic understanding of the situation by the leader would dictate that Specialist Brown be replaced for the first morning of the field exercise. Arrangements would have to be made to replace Brown, to transport Brown to the field and to return his replacement after Brown has rejoined the unit. The leader would undoubtedly be inconvenienced. Brown and his wife would, however, be satisfied; their needs would have been met. The unit would probably suffer little or no impairment in functional ability. Group cohesiveness might be promoted through group consensus that the leader is looking out for their needs. Empathetic treatment of the situation, then, would result in a modification of organizational demands and a change in leader actions.

There may be circumstances where empathetic treatment of the situation still requires that the mission receive preferential treatment. Certainly this is true when the lives of others are involved in the situation. Human relations skills allow the leader to make his decision after having viewed both sides of the problem. The leader must weigh short-term advantages against long term consequences, but in the end the decision is still his.

There are other skills which are appropriate in human relations at the first-line supervisory level. They are, however, nearly all clustered around the concept of improving or maintaining relationships within the group. The first-line supervisor is concerned almost exclusively in intragroup dynamics. He must comprehend the aspects of group dynamics discussed in the preceding chapter. With the advancement in the supervisory chain comes an increasing need for additional skills.

Low-Level Supervisor

The low-level supervisor is the company commander or first sergeant. This level of leadership is isolated from the rank and file worker by the first-line supervisor; the low-level supervisor really supervises other supervisors. At this level intergroup skills begin to gain importance as teamwork among subgroups becomes more dominant.

As with the first-line supervisor, the low-level supervisor must be proficient in those human relations skills which facilitate the motivation and development of individuals in the primary group. The need to identify additional educational requirements among subordinates, the need for indoctrination of new group members, and the ability to understand individual and group behavior all remain important to the low-level supervisor. Increasingly, however, the low-level supervisor will become involved with the coordination of subgroups, which requires greater application of intergroup skills.

The primary task associated with intergroup skills is the development of teamwork among subordinate groups. To do this, the leader must first identify subordinate team/group goals. These goals may be different from those organizational goals established by the low-level supervisor. Subordinate team goals will tend to be more group than organizationally oriented. The low-level leader must therefore be able to relate subgroup goals to unit goals. If the subgroup goal of each platoon is to be the most proficient at annual weapons qualification, the company commander will not be greatly stressed in relating that goal to the unit goal of 100% individual weapon qualification. Greater difficulty will be encountered in the reconciliation of unit and subgroup goals which are more divergent.

The low-level leader needs to specify tasks which require intergroup cooperation. Groups need not cooperate among themselves to attain a high percentage of individuals qualified on weapons firing

ranges. That is largely an individual effort in a group organization. Considerable coordination among subgroups is required to successfully conduct a coordinated attack on a specific objective. Each subgroup then has a specific task which, when completed, will contribute to the overall success of the unit. Should one subgroup fail in its task, the ability of the unit to accomplish its task would be seriously jeopardized. The rewarding of effective intergroup efforts is important to continued successful intergroup coordination. Although rewarding desirable behavior borders on behavioristic operant conditioning, better human relations are facilitated through the recognition of desirable performance.

Coordination among subgroups requires discussion among subgroup leaders. The unit leader can facilitate this interaction in many ways, both formally and informally. Communicative skills are of great importance here. Of equal importance is the recognition of the capability for all subgroup leaders to provide viable input to any discussion. As discussed earlier, wisdom is not necessarily correlated to organizational rank structure. The inherent worth of subordinate group leaders' thoughts should be recognized if coordination discussions are to be productive.

In the process of subgroup supervision, the low-level leader should be cognizant of special needs and interests of minority groups. These minority groups most generally will be spread among organizationally-directed subgroups. The company commander, for instance should know any special needs or interests of the Spanish-speaking minority from the platoons. This minority actually forms another subgroup outside of the platoons. The company commander has the need to be concerned with interactions among social or informal subgroups within the company. The company commander is therefore required to interact with more than the three subgroups which are sanctioned by the organization.

With the recognition of special needs of informal minority subgroups comes the increased requirement for demonstrated impartiality toward all group members. The dichotomy comes between the requirement for minority special need recognition and the requirement to avoid singling out a minority group for special attention. There may be a need for the non-high school graduate minority in the company to become more proficient in English in order to be more competitive for promotion. To give members of this group a fair chance for promotion, the company commander needs to provide the opportunity for additional English training. This action would meet minority needs and project

impartiality. An alternate solution would be to change the promotion system to allow for a representative proportion of the minority subgroup to be promoted regardless of ability to meet organizationally established criteria. Although the quota system may be the only way to institute impartiality in other levels of the organizational structure, at the company level it may look like unfairness and subjectivity.

The low-level supervisor needs to be concerned with coordination between his group and higher levels of the organization. As the level of supervision rises, the need to coordinate becomes greater. The company commander needs to be analytic in determining the battalion demands on the company. He has to analyze how superiors are apt to act as well as how his subordinates are motivated. The requirements for knowledge of individual behavior and group dynamics are as great at this level as they were at the first-line level. The Human Relations Decision Progression in Figure 4-2 remains appropriate at the low-level of supervision in moderating mission demands with empathy. Only the commander can determine the appropriate trade-off between mission accomplishment and the humanistic treatment of people problems. Most conflicts can be resolved in favor of the individuals without serious impairment of unit capabilities; however, in some instances the mission must be the factor to receive precedence. In these instances the ability of the commanders to exercise human relations skills and empathy can greatly reduce the psychological impact of what the individual considers to be an adverse decision. The commander who can communicate both an understanding of the problems of the individual and the critical importance of a mission which demands precedence over all other considerations will still project an image of one who is vitally concerned with the welfare of his subordinates.

Middle Level Supervisor

At the middle level of supervision there is a shift in organizational requirements from doing to planning, coordinating, and integrating. Subordinates and peers do things for staff officers for different reasons than for commanders. Therefore, at staff levels there is a shift from a legitimate power base to expert power base. The force of personality in securing willing cooperation assumes greater importance at this level, when the supervisor/leader is dealing more frequently with peers or near peers than he is at lower levels. The middle level leader is still concerned with intragroup skills which will assist him in motivating and developing subordinates in his

primary group. He is also concerned with self-expression, job satisfaction, and coordination between primary groups. The middle level leader engages in intergroup relationships in coordinating and integrating staff group interests with those of the organization. He also formulates group relations with other internal organizational groups, including identifiable minority groups.

The middle level leader plans relations between groups. To do this he must be able to identify the work goals of each group and encourage subordinate groups to participate in the planning and decision-making process. This participation in effect projects a respect for the dignity and worth of subordinates. The leader who is supportive of subordinates allows free expression of opinion. The leader who defends those opinions to superiors fosters a feeling of team commitment and purpose which is conducive to the accomplishment of organizational goals. This concept of team commitment and purpose contributes to the development of a supportive work atmosphere.

The development of a supportive work atmosphere is a primary task for the middle level leader. Paramount to the development of this atmosphere is the establishment and nurturing of a feeling of mutual trust. To maintain a desirable work atmosphere, the leader should trust and support his subordinates to the same degree as subordinates trust and support the leader. This trust is based upon the expert and referent powers of French and Raven discussed in Chapter 3. Coercive power and, to some degree, legitimate power are generally detrimental to the establishment and maintenance of a supportive work atmosphere. Trust is developed through an understanding of human behavior and needs, a demonstrated willingness to be open in communication with others, and the technical expertise appropriate for the tasks at hand.

If the leader is to develop a supportive work atmosphere, he should be aware of the difference between the classical management model and the humanistically-oriented management model as exemplified in task approach management. An understanding of the relationship between needs and behavior is key to the application of the task approach to the military environment.

A primary task of a leader exercising intergroup skills is the coordination and integration of staff group interests with those of the organization. To do this, the leader needs to identify staff group goals and clarify the roles of the groups in the organization. The leader should understand where the organization stands in its quest for goal attainment. The leader then needs to relate group

goals to the organization's demands using communication networks established between groups. This amounts to an orchestration of group efforts to conform with the organizational program.

The leader at the middle level of supervision functions more frequently as a facilitator for actions and policies than he does as formulator of policy or as a doer in accomplishing the task. Because of this requirement to serve as a facilitator, the middle level supervisor becomes involved with interpersonal skills in the formulation of work group relations with other internal organizational groups, including minority groups. In his facilitator role, the leader should recognize the existence and importance of groups other than his own. He should know how the groups function and how they contribute to the accomplishment of the organization's goals. The middle level supervisor needs to establish communications with several groups and identify those areas of interests which are common among the groups. In many instances this amounts to the establishment of rapport between himself and group leaders. Interaction among the groups can be accomplished through work situations in which each group provides input. When the groups recognize a commonality of interests and the contribution of each group to the overall organizational goal, the middle level supervisor has achieved his goal.

It is at this point where the Machiavellian tendency to manipulate becomes a real danger. The force of personality in facilitating human interaction and coordinating task accomplishment becomes a primary factor at the middle management level. Because of this, the opportunities for abuse of power through manipulation become more frequent. There is a real danger at this level to become so absorbed in the orchestration of groups and individual efforts that the supervisor loses his ability to recognize organizational demands. His goals shift from meeting those demands to the process of coordination and orchestration; the process becomes more important than anything else.

Of all organizations prone to overmanipulation, the bureaucracy provides the most fertile structure for manipulative growth. In that morass of rules, regulations and procedures, an individual who can circumvent the system and accomplish a task in spite of systematic impediments is viewed with a degree of awe and reverence. Deviant behavior is rewarded and thereby reinforced. The military, like any other bureaucracy, rewards its operators. In the interest of organizational goal attainment, however, the leader must suppress the temptation to follow the manipulative route and instead maintain a respon-

sible balance between individual, group and organizational needs. The supervisor who becomes completely involved in following every regulation to the letter is as counterproductive as the operator who bypasses the entire regulatory structure to achieve his ends.

Human relations can help to achieve the desired manipulative balance. The middle level leader does want to mold group opinion and efforts to the degree required to meet organizational demands. To maintain the proper balance the leader must acknowledge and respect the dignity of subordinates. In this recognition process, the leader must demonstrate objectivity, impartiality, openness, and empathy. As discussed earlier, it is much more difficult to manipulate people than to manipulate things. The more identifiable the individuals are in the group effort, the less likely is the probability for the leader to manipulate.

The middle level of supervision includes battalion, brigade, and division primary staff officers as well as all battalion commanders. These officers are all in a position to directly influence the capability of their own as well as the next higher unit to accomplish the organizational mission. Because decisions made at this level have serious impact on mission accomplishment, it is important that these supervisors appreciate the time constraints imposed by actions taken to accomplish organizational demands. As the level of supervision or distance between the middle level supervisor and the actual doers increases, the time required to receive information and to send instructions increases. This, in turn, requires better anticipatory planning and more open, unfettered communications.

In previous examples, we have seen that leader attempts to facilitate communications by eliminating intermediate commands have sometimes contributed to oversupervision and generated human relations problems. The questions, "How does the mid-level supervisor check on details without oversupervising?" and "How do you get two-way communications without damaging the chain of command?" may legitimately be asked.

For the middle level supervisor, General Bruce Clarke's maxim that the organization does well only that which the boss checks certainly is true. No one seriously questions the requirement for mid-level supervisors to check on those things which the commander deems to be important. There are, however, ways of checking which facilitate human relations and mission accomplishment. Some of these ways are:

1. Work through the chain of command, not around it. When inspecting a platoon, the battalion commander should be accompanied by the company commander and the platoon leader. Comments should be directed to the company commander for action he deems appropriate to correct deficiencies or to reward achievement. Similarly, when observing a battle, the battalion commander should direct his comments to the company commander. Starting with the private and moving up through the highest levels of supervision, a soldier should receive direction only from his next higher supervisor or designated representative.

2. Spot check a number of things, not one particular item. This discourages the concentration of valuable soldier time and energy on the performance of one specific task at the expense of other tasks which would be more meaningful to organizational goal attainment. The tire pressure example used earlier illustrates the damaging effects of supervisor preoccupation with one particular item or task.

3. Be as free with praise as you are with criticism. Be careful with labels; the positive ones are easily forgotten and the negative ones are hard to change.

4. Keep the organizational goal in mind. Checks should be made of things which directly effect goal or mission accomplishment. This does not mean that minor points should be ignored. In the story which traces the loss of a battle back to the loss of a horseshoe nail, certainly the inspection of horseshoes would have been a legitimate undertaking. In terms of mission accomplishment, checking for uniformity of shaving equipment would be more difficult to justify.

5. Treat subordinates, peers, and superiors as adult, worthy people. When shortcomings are found, solutions should be investigated instead of blame placed. We are all working toward a common goal, and in the long run the application of solutions will be more functional than the fixing of blame.

More complete attention will be paid to the question of oversupervision in a separate monograph on supervision.

The second question, which deals with communication, is one which is very closely related to the first. Although communications will be treated as a separate leadership dimension in a forthcoming monograph, some techniques for establishing two-way communications without damaging the chain of command are in order here. Some of these techniques are:

1. Be genuine in dealings with others. Role playing is quickly identified and frequently invalidates legitimate communications.

2. Use the chain of command in communications even though it increases the time required for the message to reach the intended person. Jumping the chain of command can be a means of compensating for poor planning. Better planning and anticipation of contingency requirements can reduce the temptation to bypass intermediate supervisors.

3. Be confident enough in yourself to accept feedback. The supervisor who is defensive and unwilling to acknowledge human failings or alternate methods of doing things quickly shuts off his only means of assessment - feedback. Subordinates and peers stop feedback by ignoring the defensive supervisor; seniors stop the feedback by eventually eliminating him from the organization.

4. Make provision for everyone being supervised to communicate with each other as well as with the supervisor. Open door policies are means for subordinates to such relief from problems and are not means for bypassing chains of commands. The organization has legitimized this channel and it can provide the commander with valuable insight into the effects of his policies if he does not allow intermediate supervisors to place constrictions in the communications pipeline.

5. Whether staff officer or commander, remember that honesty, timeliness and accuracy in communications with everyone is vital. Distorted information can bring about poor decisions dysfunctional to organizational objectives. Tact frequently makes bad news more palatable, but distortion or delay never improves news in the final assessment. The frequent distorting of information may, however, label a supervisor derogatorily.

The middle-level leader, like those at lower echelons, continues to be concerned with intragroup skills. He is, however, increasingly involved with the application of intergroup skills as he progresses up the organizational supervisory hierarchy. He spends a greater portion of his working hours practicing intergroup skills, but those capabilities which are useful in relations within the primary work group maintain their importance in relationships among primary work groups.

Top-Level Supervisor

At this level of supervision a major shift in needed skills can be observed. Intragroup skills, which are dominant in the first-line and low levels of supervision, diminish in importance at the upper echelons. Those skills which allowed the leader to determine individual needs and organizational demands establish and maintain effective two-way communications and permit empathetic understanding are still important at top supervisory levels. At this level, however, they are mainly applied to relationships among members of many groups. The top-level supervisor is concerned with the coordination of several groups and their activities. As at lower levels of supervision, the top-level supervisor needs to know the functions of many work groups. He has to organize and maintain effective communications with groups and establish areas of responsibility and authority. It would be ridiculous to expect a brigade commander to make every decision required in his organization. Similarly, a chief of staff has to trust subordinate staff members to make decisions affecting the entire organization if progress toward organizational goals is to be made. The division commander who spent his day checking tire pressures stifled the capability of subordinates to deal with problems other than tire pressures. The top-level supervisor who is unwilling to delegate authority creates identical situations at subordinate levels.

Organizing skills are important at top supervisory levels. The top-level supervisor must not only divide responsibility and authority by functional areas, but he has to locate work groups physically in such a way as to facilitate coordination among groups. Certainly a chief of staff who located his G-3 and G-2 staff sections at opposite ends of the division area would be hampering the ability of the division to accomplish its tasks. Distance blights the growth of teamwork. Minor disagreements or misunderstandings can grow into tremendous problems requiring effort and attention which otherwise could have been expended in the pursuit of organizational objectives.

Intragroup relations appropriate at top levels of supervision cluster around the creation and maintenance of a supportive work atmosphere. Those skills identified at lower supervisory levels remain appropriate. Openness in communication, willingness to accept feedback, establishment of organizational goals and rules to facilitate goal attainment, and subordinate participation remain among those actions which are required of the supervisor. As the power of the supervisor is increased by his progression through the organizational hierarchy, his reward and punishment systems have greater impact and therefore require greater inspection and more frequent revisions.

Paramount in achieving a supportive work atmosphere are the requirements to acknowledge subordinate needs and to communicate and demonstrate a willingness to support subordinate's ideas and actions.

At the top-level of supervision there is a requirement for extra-group relations. These human relations skills are necessary for the development and maintenance of contact with groups outside the organization. The supervisor should identify the need for such contacts and recognize the impact of outside groups on the capability of the organization to achieve its goals. The leader must establish communications with outside agencies and groups. Through these channels mutual goals and expectations can be devised. In contact with business groups, these goals and expectations should perhaps be formalized in a written agreement. In dealing with a civilian community, however, the mutual goals and expectations may be informally agreed upon.

In any dealing with groups or agencies outside the organization, the top-level supervisor should designate representatives to maintain liaison and to keep abreast of changes within the outside groups. The changes may be in personnel, regulatory structure, or in organizational philosophy, but all could impact on the leader's organization. Clearly it is in the best interests of the organization to have support from outside groups. Top-levels of leadership can greatly promote organizational goals through the application of appropriate human relations skills in dealings with outside groups.

The motivational skill is important to top-level leadership. At this level, leaders provide motivation to subordinates in many ways. The leader should know the impact of organizational climate on subgroup productivity. Supportive working atmosphere discussed earlier must be nurtured at top supervisory levels. An understanding of factors influencing motivation is helpful. Once motivational influences are understood, the leader will be in a position to review standard operating procedures, regulations, and policies to insure they are not working at cross-purposes to the achievement of organizational goals.

As with every other level of supervision, feedback is essential in the process of regulation evaluation and motivation effectiveness. Many times the leader is forced to make decisions based on inadequate information, relying instead on experience factors and instinctive impressions. The leader must then wait to assess the results of his actions. If results are unfavorable, the feedback should generate a form of corrective action from the leader. If the feedback is positive, the analysis may reveal an opportunity to refine or improve on that which has proven to be basically successful.

How do you get feedback at this level? Certainly feedback becomes more difficult to receive as the level of supervision gets higher. This is because the supervisor spends less time with the supervised and because intermediate levels of supervision dampen, distort, or block feedback. The supervisor at the top management level must therefore make a continuous effort to open channels for feedback and, once they are established, to guard against actions which will turn them off again.

Channels can be established by legitimizing a practice through institutionalization. The open door policy is a good example of this method. Required periodic assessments and evaluations are another. The OESO program is another. The danger in opening these means for feedback is that if they become constricted, in human relations terms, it is frequently worse than if they had never been established at all. A top level supervisor who directs that an open door policy is to be allowed between the hours of 0700 to 0730 on a Monday morning insures that the open door will not be frequently used. The message that these hours transmit to the subordinate is that the supervisor really doesn't want to hear about problems or receive feedback. The subordinate then might go outside the organization for redress or he might emotionally disassociate himself from the organization. At the top level of supervision, the leader must be open, genuine in his desire for feedback, and have a self-concept which will permit him to receive negative feedback, process it objectively, and take steps to correct problems. The supervisor who receives negative feedback and dismisses it as poppycock insures two things: that there will be progressively less negative feedback and that there will be progressively greater dissatisfaction and problems in the organization.

Top-levels of supervision, then, are still concerned with intra-group and intergroup skills used at lower echelons. An added dimension is the extra-group skill required for relations with groups outside the scope of the organizations. All skills maintain a commonality in basic considerations of respect and dignity of the individual, the importance of feedback and other communications, and empathetic treatment of individual and subordinate group problems.

Executive Level Supervisor

The executive is the top supervisory level. He, too, needs human relations skills. In the Army, the executive level of leadership consists of general officers. This select group steers one of the largest organizations in the nation. Leaders at this level become almost exclusively involved with extra-group relationships. They make daily

congressional contacts, manage research and development projects in conjunction with industry, and otherwise provide the material, facilities, and climate required for the maintenance of a national armed force. Their jobs deal with personalities and groups outside the organization. The same extra-group skills identified in the top management level are appropriate for application to human relations at the executive level.

Feedback at the executive level is very difficult to attain because information is filtered through so many intermediate supervisors. At this level it is quite possible for a subordinate or deputy to control the actions of the supervisor by controlling the information that the executive sees. This data manipulation may be the result of poor self-concept driving the subordinate to suppress bad news, it may be because the subordinate uses information control to foster his own career, or it may be the result of double messages sent by the executive himself.

Because the executive is isolated from the lower supervisory levels and because his own first hand experience is chronologically far-removed, it is very important for the executive to maintain operational feedback channels. The means of establishing and maintaining these feedback channels are the same as with lower levels of supervision, but the executive must be more sensitive than other levels to his effect on communications. Words of suggestion can be interpreted as directives, thinking out loud can be construed as orders by subordinates anxious to anticipate the executive, and words of criticism can be easily viewed as direct attacks on subordinates' abilities or potentialities. Because subordinate contact with the executive is very limited, those words used during infrequent contacts have great impact. An executive can go to great lengths to establish feedback channels only to have all those efforts nullified by a few incautious remarks perceived as rebuffs by subordinates. The killing of the messenger bearing bad news is symbolically reenacted every time an executive reacts defensively to feedback. The inevitable result is, again, the termination of feedback.

If an executive really wishes to establish and maintain feedback loops, he must actively strive to eliminate dichotomies in rules of communications. If he desires openness and genuineness he must model these behaviors. If he expects subordinates who come to him with problems to also recommend specific solutions, the executive should also provide specific recommendations for correcting faults he finds with things submitted to him for approval. Most important of all, he should take absolute ownership of his feelings and statements. "This

product stinks." is an absolute statement which does not ask for or tolerate any feedback or response. It is also drawing a conclusion about the product or the subordinate, placing the blame there instead of explaining the dynamics that is really taking place. "I have a great deal of trouble believing this to be true (accurate, factual, quality, etc)" conveys the same message but allows for feedback or comment. It also places the problem exactly - with the acceptability of the product to the supervisor. A subordinate can deal with that directly because he knows that with which he must deal. A subordinate cannot deal well with, or respond to, "gut reactions" or generalizations.

Intergroup relations skills are also appropriate to the executive, especially those in the lower portions of this level. Division commanders are still concerned with orchestrating the efforts of subordinate commands. Corps commanders are concerned with the actions of the divisions, and so on. The uses of intergroup and extra-group skills are dependent upon the mission of the organization. Intragroup skills are conceptually applicable to each of the other skill types. As the size of the organization at the executive level requires delegation of authority, so does the size of the group preclude active major executive level participation in all group tasks. The decreasing capability for meaningful interpersonal relations in a work group of divisional size requires that the commander deal with a few trusted subordinates. Intergroup and extra-group group skills therefore become more important to the executive in his quest to achieve organizational objectives.

Summary

Figure 4-3 illustrates the skills in order of importance at the five levels of supervision.




Figure 4-3. Skills Appropriate to Supervisory Levels.

These general skills are derived from specific skills which need to be practiced if a supervisor really desires to apply human relations competencies to the work environment.

Specific skills necessary for human relations competence are summarized in Brammer's (1973) outline:

A. Skills Leading to Understanding

1. Listening Skills

- 1.1 Attending
- 1.2 Paraphrasing
- 1.3 Clarifying
- 1.4 Perception checking

2. Leading Skills (similar to attending skills)

- 2.1 Indirect leading
- 2.2 Direct leading
- 2.3 Focusing
- 2.4 Questioning

3. Reflecting Skills

- 3.1 Feeling
- 3.2 Content
- 3.3 Experience

4. Summarizing Skills

- 4.1 Feeling
- 4.2 Content
- 4.3 Process

5. Confronting Skills

- 5.1 Describing feelings
- 5.2 Expressing feelings
- 5.3 Feeding back
- 5.4 Meditating
- 5.5 Repeating
- 5.6 Associating

6. Interpreting Skill

- 6.1 Explaining
- 6.2 Questioning
- 6.3 Fantasizing

7. Informing Skill

- 7.1 Giving information
- 7.2 Giving advice
- 7.3 Suggesting

B. Skills for Comfort and Crisis Utilization

1. Supporting Skill

- 1.1 Contracting
- 1.2 Reassuring
- 1.3 Relaxing

2. Crisis Intervening Skill

- 2.1 Building hope
- 2.2 Consoling
- 2.3 Controlling

3. Centering Skill

- 3.1 Identifying strengths
- 3.2 Reviewing growth experiences
- 3.3 Recalling peak experiences

4. Referring

C. Skills for Positive Action

1. Problem-solving and Decision-making Skills

- 1.1 Identifying problems
- 1.2 Changing problems into goals
- 1.3 Analyzing problems
- 1.4 Exploring a course of action
- 1.5 Planning a course of action
- 1.6 Generalizing to new problems

2. Behavior Modifying Skill

- 2.1 Modeling
- 2.2 Rewarding
- 2.3 Extinguishing
- 2.4 Desensitizing

These skills are as applicable to human relations as they are to counseling the counseling context from which they were drawn. They are characterized by a humanistic orientation toward people. Under classical management models, it might be possible to reduce the importance of these skills in the overall process of organizational goal attainment. In task-oriented management models similar to that used by the Army today, the human factor cannot become subordinate if the organization is to achieve its goals. The requirement for human relations in the organization to achieve its goals has become a reality. With that reality comes the need for proficiency in human relations skills.

PART III

HUMAN RELATIONS

HISTORICALLY

CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to explain the development of human relations, this chapter will briefly explore the history of human relations in industry and in the Army. This historical examination becomes important to the process of human relations development in the Army by providing a model to examine the stages through which industry moved to achieve greater efficiency and organizational attainment. The stages of industrial human relations development are applicable to the study of the Army human relations developmental process.

Human relations development in industry began to move forward rapidly in the early part of this century. Frederick W. Taylor's theory of scientific management based on time-motion studies was one of the first attempts at the development of human relations, but the human relations aspect was relegated to a focus on increased labor output and productivity. Although working conditions in his organization did not appreciably improve by the use of "scientific management," the profit-motive concept did gain wider acceptance. The goals of Taylor's management theory were higher efficiency through improved management and greater collaboration among those working in industry, but maximum prosperity to Taylor meant maximum production. There were two important things in terms of human feelings and interaction with which Taylor failed to deal: communications continued to be one-way, with no possibility for feedback, and working conditions did not improve. The motivation for cooperation continued to be profit instead of human relations. Figure 5-1 shows the relationship between management theory, source discipline, and management technique (Kelly, 1969).

<u>Source Discipline</u>	<u>Theory</u>	<u>Techniques</u>
Engineering Industrial Psychology	Classical Theory of Organization (Taylor)	Time Study Work Study Method Study Production, Planning, and Control

Figure 5-1. Relationships.

A modification to the scientific management approach resulted from a study by Elton Mayo at the Western Electric plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, beginning in 1927. Mayo and his associates set up an experimental group and a control group and began a systematic change in the variables of heat, light, and humidity--classic concerns of scientific management. Production rose as conditions improved, but when the original conditions were restored, production continued at the same high level. Fortunately, Mayo and his associates were alert for effects they had not anticipated. They began to investigate human factors and found that morale was high among the workers, partly because they had been relieved of the normal supervisory controls and partly because they had been singled out for special attention in the study. This phenomenon came to be termed the Hawthorne effect.

In Human Relations: From Theory to Practice, Henderson sums up the conclusions to be drawn from Mayo's research:

1. Work is a group activity.
2. The social world of the adult is oriented to the work activity.
3. The worker's needs for recognition, security, and a sense of belonging are more important for high morale than the physical conditions in which he works.
4. Complaints are often symptoms of greater problems and not necessarily accurate or objective reflections of fact.
5. Social demands on and off the job determine each worker's attitudes and effectiveness on the job.
6. Informal groups on the job exercise strong social controls over the attitudes and work habits of every worker.
7. The change from an established to an adaptive society tends to continually disrupt the social organization of the work plant.
8. Group collaboration must be planned and developed; it is not spontaneous.

These conclusions are probably as valid in today's military organization as they were at Western Electric nearly fifty years ago. Figure 5-2 illustrates the development of management as a result of Mayo's Hawthorne studies (Kelly, 1969).




Figure 5-2. Relationships.

In any developmental process, the attitude of society in which the process is taking place is of great importance. For a change to be effective, society must be ready for and supportive of the change. The development of human relations in the United States during the depression era is described by Strother (1963), who said:

Human relations was in the air. A few miles away from the Hawthorne works, Carl Rogers was evolving a non-directive technique of counseling which was, in its essentials, almost identical with the interviewing technique developed at Hawthorne, and these very similar techniques were developed without any interaction between the two. This concern with the individual was to be further heightened by the increasing weight of the Great Depression. The dream of "a chicken in every pot" was being replaced by concern for "the forgotten man." The New Deal gave public expression to this concern in a mass of social legislation. The Wagner Act and the phenomenal growth of union membership which followed it forced management to re-examine its traditional policies in the light of collective bargaining.

World War II, with its wage freeze and its excess profits tax, made good human relations more attractive to management: competition for manpower on a "noninflationary" basis forced management to consider non-economic incentives, and excess profits taxes marked the cost of these incentives down to bargain-basement prices. The increasing diffusion of ownership and the resultant separation of the functions of ownership from those of management also made top management more sensitive to objectives other than profit.

Further progress in managerial development was made by Douglas McGregor with an important comparison of management theories. He said that Theory X, the traditional or classical approach espoused by Taylor, was not adequate for the full utilization of human potential. Theory Y, based largely on Maslow's hierarchy of needs (see figure 2-2), was more conducive to the realization of both organizational and individual goals.

Theory X, Conventional Management, assumes that:

(1) Management is responsible for organizational elements of production (such as money, men, material, and machines--the 4 M's) for the purpose of maximizing returns.

(2) This process of maximizing returns requires that management direct the efforts of employees through motivation, control and behavior modification to meet the demands of the organization. The implications for manipulation are very strong.

(3) Workers are passive, resistant to organizational demands unless they are persuaded, punished or controlled. Management means getting things done through other people.

Theory X makes implicit assumptions concerning human nature. These are:

(1) The average employee is indolent, tries to just get by, and is essentially an "8-to-5" man.

(2) The employee has little ambition or need for responsibility and requires leadership in order to fulfill his tasks.

(3) Man is self-centered and unconcerned with the needs of the organization.

(4) Man is fundamentally resistant to change.

(5) Man is gullible and easily led. There is a sharp division between leaders and followers.

According to McGregor, management has observed Theory X to be true, not as a result of man's nature, but because of the nature of business organizations and management practices. Theory X actually breeds counterforces, restrictive practices, and antagonism.

McGregor's Theory Y is based on the premise that motivation is divided into four categories: (1) safety and psychological needs, (2) social needs, (3) ego needs, and (4) self-fulfillment needs. Theory Y assumes that:

(1) Management is responsible for the organization for production and the integration of the 4 M's of Theory X to reach organizational objectives. This is as true in the military as it is in the business community.

(2) People are really not naturally passive or resistant to organizational needs. If they are passive or resistant, it is because of their experience in organizations where managers are "making their mark." This could be equated to "ticket punching" commands in the military structure, where successful command is essential to continued promotion in the system. Leaders who make their mark often do so at the expense of long-range unit effectiveness.

(3) Management has the responsibility to utilize the complexity of human motivation to include the needs of people for the opportunity to direct their own behavior and to assume some responsibility for their own destiny. In the military this need can be expressed in terms of desires for mission-type orders and minimum supervision outside the work group.

(4) The principal responsibility of management is to organize matters so that people can achieve their personal goals by directing their efforts toward organizational objectives. By meeting organizational demands they also meet personal needs. If a soldier's goal is

promotion, he will be more effective if he can be shown that increased efficiency results in rapid promotion.

Theory Y requires decentralization and delegation, job enlargement, and performance appraisal. The president of Volvo recently built an auto assembly plant which is based on Theory Y premises. In the three years of its operation it has proven so effective in terms of production and worker satisfaction that additional plants are planned. The key to the success of the project, according to the president of the firm, is to be less technocratic and more people-oriented. Managers must not fear losing authority (Roach, 1977).

Theory Y lends itself to the task approach of management. The progression of organizational leadership development has been from the classical theory through the human relations school to the task approach of management. Kelly (1969) defines the task approach as an approach which

...treats an organization as a sociotechnical system and is concerned with the development of optimal organizations within which the objective and the available resources, both human and technical, determine the activities to be performed and the methods of work to be employed. Three propositions illustrative of the terse economic excellence of the task are:

(i) Technology is a major determinant of industrial behavior; (ii) Optimal organization is not a function of personality; (iii) Generally any attempt to optimize an end-product variable will cause other end-product variables to become increasingly suboptimal. Production blitzes are frequently achieved at the expense of product mix, maintenance, or morale. In this context the major management problem is the definition of acceptable margins of suboptimality in the significant variables.

Management had to accept task management when the subject of management changed from an art to a science. New concepts requiring conscious planning of organizations to integrate the demands of the organization and the needs of the labor force contributed to this metamorphosis. Figure 5-3 shows the progression of management theory development from Taylor's classical model through Mayo's human relations model to the task approach model.




Figure 5-3. Relationships.

Summary

The theory of management has gone through three phases of development during this century. First was the classical theory of management in which the worker was just another instrument of production or a means of getting a job done. The personnel supervisor was viewed as a welfare officer who was responsible for providing the human cure to managerial preoccupation with people as things. This management model was useful in a time when heavy industry (iron and steel production) was emphasized and when laborers were relatively unsophisticated.

The second phase, the human relations school, began during the depression era, when many executives viewed management as if it were identical with personnel management. Management gave up its direct control of production and concentrated on human relations as a means of indirect production control. This seemed to say that if management met the needs of the workers, the workers would meet the demands of the organization. This management model was appropriate to assembly line work and to higher levels of work. It lasted through the 1950's

until the third phase, the task approach, evolved. The task approach was a fusing of the two previous schools and resulted in the realignment of organizational demands and personal needs into common objectives. It reflects a renewed interest in total systems and is, perhaps, connected with emphasis on totality and with high-level manufacture of complex units. Laborers are relatively sophisticated.

If we take the personnel officer in Figure 5-4 and substitute the Army supervisor, it is possible to trace the development of leadership concepts in the Army over the past half-century.




Figure 5-4. The Evolution of the Personnel Officer Role.

Unlike the personnel officer, the Army supervisor continues to report to the same official.

Kelly (1969) gives an excellent review of the changing role of the personnel officer (leader).

Historically the personnel manager has been seen in three roles:

1. As welfare officer--where too often the "canteen and latrine" function was prime; where the provision of playing fields and a sports club was accepted as management's answer to the dreariness of work as a necessary evil; and where the annual excursion and the works dance were the festive occasions during which it was not unknown for the "boss and his blokes" to dissolve all barriers of communication in a welter of alcohol.
2. As a human relations specialist--where his job was to establish the image of the company as a good place to work ("We are just one big happy family here"). The essence of personnel management at this stage was to be a good guy and treat your workers as people. In this phase, everybody was supposed to be happy, but in many firms nothing very much happened in a productive sense.
3. As an organizational analyst--where his responsibility is the specification of optimal organization in which both productive efficiency and human satisfaction can be achieved. Here the personnel manager is concerned with designing organizational structure, writing role descriptions, producing manpower forecasts, and introducing job evaluation schemes.

These changes in the role of the personnel manager from welfare officer, via the human relations specialist to the organizational analyst have been associated with...changes in management ideology.

Figure 5-5 graphically illustrates this transition (Kelly, 1969).




Figure 5-5. Frame of Reference for Analysis of the Subject, "ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOUR"

It is possible to show high correlations between stages of management development in industry with management development in the Army. The Army, however, has developed more slowly than industry in the development of human relations awareness.

In the Army, except for a brief period of experimentation with human relations in early 1950, the classical management model period lasted well into the 1960's. It was a period when the soldier was considered another tool with which to accomplish the organizational mission. It was during this period when some commanders, perceiving racial unrest, declared that there was no black or white in the organization; everyone was olive drab. Soldiers were given service clubs, gymnasiums, libraries, and craft shops and were expected to be happy and contented.

The human relations period began in the Army at the end of the Viet Nam era with the abolition of the draft and the subsequent shift to an all-volunteer force. This period was epitomized by the United States Army Recruiting Command's slogan, "The Army wants to join you." It was the period of beer in the barracks, various councils for enlisted and ethnic membership, and wholesale attempts by the Army at image-changing. The failing of the human relations phase was that it never really penetrated the organization. Recruiters, like side show barkers, proclaimed its merits; top level management subscribed to the theory; but first-line supervisors, trained in a classical management model, continued to conduct day-to-day business using those methods of personnel control which had been used for years. The dichotomy between recruiting slogans and the actual work environment may have led to soldier dissatisfaction, unrest, and disciplinary problems. Desertion rates were the same as they were during the Viet Nam War, even though the threat of war had been eliminated (Sublett and Greenfield, 1977). It became quite clear to all echelons of the Army's leadership that the human relations management model was not going to solve its recruiting or readiness problems. It abandoned the human relations school and moved on to the task approach.

The task approach is a relatively new innovation in the Army and has really started to penetrate the structure since 1976. It is still too soon to state the effectiveness of this approach. Recent studies (Sublett and Greenfield, 1977) indicate that desertion rates are lower, which may show that the soldiers find in the organization what they have expected to find at the time of enlistment. The organization effectiveness staff officer appears to be a major step in the development of the task approach in lower management levels of supervision. First-line supervision continues, however, to employ largely classical management techniques.

Organizationally, human relations development in the military is progressing at a rate comparable to that of industry. Interpersonal human relations development in the Army appears to be making slower progress. Race relations continues to receive emphasis, but recent regulation revisions have effectively shifted the emphasis and responsibilities to major command levels. The greatest problems in human relations are at the person-to-person level; and the first-line supervisor appears to be the most ill-prepared of any supervisor to deal effectively with interpersonal problems. Hopefully, this condition can be corrected through the infusion by the supervisor of a greater awareness for the tremendous positive effect good human relations has on the ability of a unit to meet organizational demands. This

awareness can best be acquired through the understanding of the many factors which influence human behavior.

PART IV

FINAL THOUGHTS
and
IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER SIX

FINAL THOUGHTS

In the preceding chapters those elements which influence and are influenced by human relations have been examined in both the organizational and interpersonal environments. The progression from the classical management model, in which workers or troops were considered to be another tool with which to accomplish the organization's goals, to the human relations model was traced. The transition from the classical to the human relations management models in the military did not keep pace with society. After a brief use of the human relations management model prior to the Korean War, the Army regressed to the classical management model, where it remained for the next two decades.

The inception of the all-volunteer Army concept, combined with an erosion of discipline and standards in the Army during and immediately after the Viet Nam War, brought about the transition from classical management to human relations management models in the early 1970's. Because lower levels of supervision had not been adequately prepared for the transition of management theories and still clung to classical management methods, the experiment in human relations management in the Army was short-lived. Contrary to popular recruiting slogans, the Army (at least lower management) really did not want to join the civilian population. The dichotomy between expectations of enlistees and the realities of the environment after training created many problems, such as absences without leave, desertion, and administrative discharge for failure to adjust. Nearly half of the soldiers failed to complete their first terms of enlistment. There were obvious problems with the human relations approach to management as it was practiced in the Army.

The problems encountered with the human relations management approach precipitated the change to task approach management similar to McGregor's Theory Y management model. By combining individual and organizational goals, management can more easily motivate individuals to accomplish organizational tasks. To be effective, however, this management model requires increased communications reliability. The soldier must perceive the relationship between his personal goals and organizational demands. If a new enlistee can be shown that diligent study will help him reach his goal of proficiency as a heavy equipment operator, the Army's goal of encouraging study to produce a proficient heavy construction engineer from its training program will be

realized. Certainly the soldier is more easily motivated to become a proficient equipment operator than he would be to expend the same effort in the study of Shakespeare. There is a clear association between study and individual goals in the first instance; there is no clear relationship between personal goals and study in the second.

The Hawthorne experiments and Maslow's self-actualization studies have suggested that persons are more productive when they consider themselves to be participants in activities and providers of input to managerial decisions. This fact seems to invalidate classical management theories and to reinforce those which foster task approach management. To become fully participating members of a primary work group, it is important for the individual to know himself and those factors which influence individual behavior. With each successive study, the importance of self-concept to individual goal establishment and attainment becomes more evident. A person's emotional adjustment is based primarily on how he sees himself and how he feels about himself, consciously, subconsciously, and unconsciously. The story about the efficiency report narrative which stated that "this officer consistently fails to live up to the low standards he sets for himself" has more truth than humor. The individual who feels negatively about himself will generally set goals for himself which are ridiculously high so he cannot be blamed when he fails or he may set goals well below his capabilities. He may also set no goals at all and content himself with floating through his existence. The exception to this is the low self-concept person who masks that concept from himself and others by the process of power acquisition. It is as though the accumulation of power provides positive proof of the intrinsic worth of the individual, in denial of what the individual really believes to be true.

Self-concept tends to be established early in life and remains relatively stable over time unless a concerted effort is made by the individual to change the concept. Because self-concept is learned through individual perception of events and interpretation of feedback, the process of change required to alter self-concept is one of learning. The individual must learn to interpret feedback in a different way and to expand his basis of perception. Most of all, he must learn to view introspection positively. This is not to say that he should view himself as positively worthless. It means that the individual must learn to be prepared for positive feedback or event interpretation. He must learn to accept the possibility that events and feedback may prove the worth of the individual. The probability that an increase in self-concept will occur without extrapersonal

assistance is small. The leader, knowledgeable of factors which influence self-concept and of the organizational benefits to be derived from individuals with high self-concept, should constantly evaluate subordinates and assist those in need of help. A slow, systematic and progressive learning process is required to gradually raise low self-concepts to a desirable, tenable level. The learning process makes implicit the cooperation of the individual. Without cooperation, little learning will transpire; therefore, little conceptual change will be evident. Self-concept changes can be effected only through concentrated efforts of both the individual and the helper.

Considerable attention has been paid in this monograph to the subject of group process. The primary group was investigated to determine its composition and dynamics. The primary group heavily influences the behavior of its members. Individuals must conform to group norms or face sanctions from the other members. In environments in which primary groups are formed on the basis of the commonality of interests and goals of the members, group consensus is relatively easy to establish. In military primary groups, formal membership is determined by the organization. Legitimate power is the basis upon which the group is established and maintained. The interests and goals of group members may vary considerably. An additional problem is created when the leader is appointed by a source outside the primary group rather than selected by the members from within the group. Since the military primary group is artificially or randomly created, leaders are placed in a position where they must earn the trust and confidence of the membership.

The leader who wishes to establish himself in the group should expect to effectively use interpersonal skills. Members must rely upon him to meet (within the limits of organizational capabilities) their needs. These needs are not always apparent. The leader should be proficient at diagnosing needs and problems. He should be aware that symptoms are frequently merely indications that a problem exists and that complaints are often unrelated to actual problems and needs. The leader should learn to recognize that when a soldier perceives something to be a problem he must deal with the perception and not just dismiss it as being inaccurate. If the soldier perceives something to be a problem, then to him it is a problem. The leader must deal first with the perception and then investigate to determine if there is a less apparent problem requiring attention. This requires the leader to initiate action rather than merely react to a problem.

In addition to supervisory duties, the leader must frequently serve as a counselor for both personal and performance matters. Those counseling skills identified in the counseling monograph are appropriate to the military environment. The leader must keep many things in mind when performing the counseling services. First, the leader must recognize and keep foremost in his consciousness the inherent dignity and worth of the individual. Unconditional positive regard for the soldier can be maintained without the leader condoning the behavior which precipitated the counseling. If the leader finds that he is unable to meet this requirement, he should refer the soldier to some other counselor who can maintain that feeling of positive regard. In performance counseling, it is behavior which should be addressed, not the worth of the individual.

In addition to maintaining an attitude and atmosphere conducive to counseling, the leader should recognize the nature of the counselor-counselee relationship. In the civilian community, the counselee most frequently comes voluntarily to the counselor. He is actively seeking help. In the military the soldier is summoned by the leader or sent by a supervisor. The entire basis for the relationship is therefore altered. In military performance counseling, the counselee probably would rather be anywhere else but in that situation. The counselee frequently enters the counseling relationship by virtue of legitimate (and perhaps coercive) power. In industrial counseling, the power basis may be the same, but the client can exercise the option of removing himself from the organization. That option is not available to the soldier. In civilian community personal counseling, the basis for counselor authority is expert power. This permits the counselor and the client to operate on a basis of interpersonal equality. In every military situation except peer counseling, the leader maintains his position by legitimate power and the implied threat of coercive power.

Because the power bases differ in the military from those in the civilian community, the leader may find that a directive approach to counseling is more appropriate to meet the soldier's needs. The humanistic approach outlined in the counseling monograph may be difficult for some leaders to adapt to the military counseling situation. However, the skills of human interaction discussed in this monograph and the counseling monograph are appropriate, even essential, to the military counseling environment. In military counseling, the inability to guarantee confidentiality must be compensated for through integrity, honesty, openness, and empathy.

In discussing intragroup and intergroup relations the needs for open communications and unimpeded channels for feedback were addressed. Members of primary groups must know what is required from them by the organization and how these demands will affect them and the organization. To members of the primary group, the organization frequently is the leader. In the application of human relations skills, it is incumbent upon the leader to explain the reasons for a demand and not just deliver the demand. In combat it may not be practical to explain the reason behind every order. However, studies have shown that populations are more willing to accept directive leadership when threatened by an external force than they are to accept directive leadership when unthreatened. This means that whenever possible the leader should respect the dignity of the subordinate by explaining the reason for a demand.

Sensitivity for people and their needs was identified as a major contributing factor to leader effectiveness. Supporting data proved that there was a strong correlation between improved sensitivity of human needs and leader performance. The basis of power and the effects of manipulation on the individual and the organization were examined in some detail, and the subject of ethics was addressed.

There are many different types of leadership. Each type has different characteristics. Kelly (168, p. 135) has shown the differences in leadership types in Figure 6-1. It gives, in a very simplistic form, those qualities which characterize the thirteen variables which Kelly found appropriate to all three types of leadership.

	Individual	Group	Organization
Name	head	group leader	resource person
Method of appointment	from above	from below	from above, but acceptable to those below
Basis of authority	legal	group acceptance	structural and sapiential
Communications	vertically downwards	two-way	structural
Psychological distance	wide	narrow	variable
Responsible to	superior	peers	superiors, peers, subordinates, and clients
Qualities of the leader ...	omniscient, omnipotent	human relations skills	task specialist
Behavior pattern	autocratic	democratic	reality-centered
Numbers	an elite	everybody	a large elite
Followers	lazy, passive, uncooperative	"good guys"	other organization men
Authority legitimated by ..	legal source	acceptable to the group	organizational logic
Attitude to conflict	suppresses	ignores	accepts but exploits
Attitude to error	elimination	frequently increases	seeks to minimize

Figure 6-1. Three Types of Leadership.

This figure summarizes some of the concepts dealing with power, behavior, and psychological distance as set forth in this monograph. It also provides a model for the reader to examine his own organization and evaluate it in terms of the leadership type it fosters.

All three leadership types can be further divided into two distinct categories: those based on consideration (relationship-motivated) and those based on initiating structure (task-motivated). Leadership effectiveness of both categories can be improved by the application of human relations principles and skills. The humanistic approach to problem-solving implies the use of a definite model. The steps in this model are:

1. Define the problem. This requires that the leader look beyond obvious symptoms to determine underlying reasons for behavior.

2. Initiate change. This may be corrective action, counseling, a change in organizational structure, demands, or rules to eliminate problem sources.

3. Stabilize the change. The leader must be concerned with preventing a recurrence of the problem. To do this by applying humanistic principles, he may opt to use one or more of the following techniques:

- a. Assign specific responsibilities to individuals. This adds structure and reduces ambiguity. The soldier knows what is expected from him.

- b. Give authority along with responsibility. This gives the soldier the ability to accomplish a task.

- c. Supervision comes from only one source. This eliminates the requirement for a subordinate to please more than one boss on a specific task. Since no two persons perceive a situation exactly alike, no two supervisors will require the exact same behavior from subordinates.

- d. Provide required support - moral, physical, emotional, administrative, and logistical.

- e. Subdivide groups as required based on analysis of the task and a grouping of like activities.

4. Spread this system to other areas. If a solution works well in one environment, consider giving it a try in another.

5. Reevaluate. Use feedback to reassess the situation. Do not be reluctant to admit that the solution was less than successful. Allow subordinates to reevaluate and admit diagnostic mistakes without penalty.

If the Army is to be successful in its transition from a classical management model to a task-approach management model, we all should recognize that human relations is a prerequisite. The merger of individual goals and organizational demands cannot be accomplished if leaders, especially at lower levels, cannot or will not identify the needs and objectives of subordinates. It is an error to assume that all leaders are concerned with subordinates' needs and objectives. There should be some sort of awareness or sensitivity program to explain the system requirements. Traditionally, we have failed to do this. We write efficiency reports with no institutional guidance to tell the rater, indorser, and the ratee what the report really means in terms of promotion, schooling and assignments. We talk of trust and confidence in service schools and then do not institutionally model the behavior. The moral climate is such that a few senior commanders have advocated government-operated houses of prostitution for soldiers on unaccompanied tours, while others have advocated dismissal from the service for officers who have engaged in a single infidelity. No one knows from unit to unit what the standard for enforcing the ethical code is until the commander announces it.

If we have not taken the time to resolve these matters, it is unrealistic to assume that the matter of human relations will receive the attention it deserves unless the leadership of the Army bands together and produces a comprehensive, meaningful model for the application of human relations to task-approach management in the Army. Top and executive management levels must formally state requirements, model behaviors, and provide active support to subordinates if human relations in the military management system is ever to become a meaningful reality. The human relations management approach was organizationally defeated because it was not supported, or even understood, by all leadership echelons. Unless an understanding of the integration of human relations and mission requirements is gained and supported by all of us, task-approach management is doomed to failure in the Army. We cannot expect task-approach management to work unless we make a sincere effort to make it successful.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPLICATIONS

Human relations in the military can have tremendous impact on the Army, not as a management model, but as a fundamental part of a task-oriented approach to management. Self-concept is recognized as a major influence on individual performance. Supervisor attitudes and actions have a major impact on self-concept. If human relations has facilitated job satisfaction, increased production, & personal development in industry, the implications for the Army are obvious.

One of the major problems facing the Army today is the retention of first-term enlistees through their initial obligation. A significant number of the new enlistees will drop out or be rejected from the Army prior to their contractual discharge date. Would the application of human relations skills retain in the system a major part of the drop-outs? Experience in industry indicates that human relations skills have a major impact on retention.

What human relations skills can do for job satisfaction should have a significant effect on reenlistment rates. If soldiers can meet their needs in the Army and enjoy their work, it is reasonable to assume that many will remain in the Army for extended periods. The benefits derived from the retention of skilled, experienced soldiers have long been recognized by the organization. Human relations can help to achieve those organizational benefits.

The retention of satisfied, trained, experienced personnel in the Army would, of course, affect the requirement for replacement soldiers. With a decreased demand for personnel, it would be possible to raise the standards for enlistment to only those individuals who are most qualified. A Marine Corps Study (Haber, 1975) showed that non-high school graduates were eliminated from the service at a ratio of 3 to 1 when compared to loss rates for high school graduates. A similar study of Army armor crewman retention (Hartjen, 1978) showed a similar trend. If the Army can retain enough qualified personnel, it can also increase the standards for enlistment. In that event, a greater percentage of completed enlistments and reenlistments could be expected. The monetary savings alone would be tremendous.

Indirect, less measurable implications of effective human skills application are not empirical. How can individual growth, satisfaction, and increased feeling of self-worth be accurately measured?

What would be the physical implications for soldiers who experience a significant reduction in stress because of increased supervisor sensitivity to human needs? There are many other questions which could be asked. The proof of the worth of human relations skills appropriately applied can only be furnished and measured once the skills have been applied.

We know that unit performance is highly correlated to the commander's interactions with his troops. We also know that unit effectiveness is greatly enhanced by the cohesion that results from the group process discussed in chapter three. All group interaction is facilitated by the effective leader application of human relations skills. If we want more combat-ready units and more confident, effective troops, we need to apply human relations to our leadership processes.

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